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THE BENEFITS OF OPT-IN FEDERALISM
BRENDAN

S.

MAHER*

Abstract: The Affordable Care Act ("ACA") is a controversial and historic
statute that mandates people make insurance bargains. Unacknowledged
is an innovative mechanism ACA uses to select the law that governs those
bargains: opt-in federalism. Opt-in federalism-in which individuals may
in part choose between federal and state rules-is a promising theoretical
means to make and choose law. This Article explains why and concludes
that the appeal of opt-in federalism is independent of the ACA. Whatever
the statute's constitutional fate, future policymakers should consider optin federalist approaches to answer fundamental but exceedingly difficult
questions of health and retirement law.
INTRODUCTION

Few national debates have rivaled the intensity of those regarding
the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act ("ACA").1 It is not difficult to see why. Sickness spares no one. Nor, some fear, does the federal
government. The ACA involves both.

* C 2011, Brendan S. Maher, Assistant Professor, Oklahoma City University School of
Law. J.D., Harvard Law School; A.B., Stanford University. This Article is the latest in a series analyzing the importance of the Supreme Court, federalism, choice, and legal rules
regarding the provision of retirement income and health care in America. See generally
John Bronsteen, Brendan S. Maher & Peter K. Stris, ERISA, Agency Costs, and the Future of
Health Care in the United States, 76 FORDHAM L. REv. 2297 (2008); Brendan S. Maher, Creating a PaternalisticMarket for Legal Rules Affecting the Benefit Promise, 2009 Wis. L. REv. 657;
Brendan S. Maher & Peter K. Stris, ERISA & Uncertainty, 88 WASH. U. L. REv. 433 (2010).
The series, and this paper, also draws upon research undertaken in connection with litigating Conkright v. Fromnert, 130 S. Ct. 1640 (2010) and LaRue v. DeWolff Boberg, & Associates,
Inc., 552 U.S. 248 (2008), two recent cases before the U.S. Supreme Court. Many thanks to
the participants at the Washington University Junior Scholars workshop, as well as Tom
Baker, Brian Galle, Abbe Gluck, Elizabeth Leonard, Abigail Moncrieff, Paul Secunda, Daniel Schwarcz, and Peter Stris, for their comments and criticism.
I The landmark legislation is actually two acts: the Patient Protection and Affordable
Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010), as amended by the Health Care and
Education Reconciliation Act, Pub. L. No. 111-152, 124 Stat. 1029 (2010). Herein I refer to
the two pieces of legislation collectively as "ACA" rather than "PPACA." The former is easier to read and say.
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Lines in the sand have been drawn over the ACA's constitutionality. 2
Prominent law professors and dozens of state attorneys general are on
one side; equally prominent law professors, as well as the Obama administration, are on the other.3 Given the split among federaljudges to
have considered the question, most cannot help but wonder on which
side Justice Anthony Kennedy will fall. 4 The resolution of these constitutional battles will be of unquestionable historic importance.
The constitutional dispute is part of a larger argument that is perhaps America's oldest: what is the proper role of the federal government? 5 In these debates, the federal government is often cast as either a
tyrant or a savior.6 Much of the current thinking about the ACA proceeds along these lines. 7 Yet there is a third role for the federal gov-

ernment: enabler.
Imagine if the federal government deployed its power to increase
the ability of individuals and states to choose law. That is precisely what
the ACA in part contemplates. Using a legal structure this Article de2 Legislators are readying for battle as well. See Kate Pickert, Obamacare Goes Under the
Knife, TIME, Jan. 17, 2011, at 48, 48 ("[T]he enactment of [the ACA is] less like the dawn
of a new era and more like the start of a long partisan war over whether reform should
proceed at all.").
3 Compare Randy Barnett, Editorial, The InsuranceMandate in Peril, WALL ST. J., Apr. 29,
2010, at A19 (arguing that the mandate is unconstitutional), with Laurence Tribe, Op-Ed.,
On Health Care, Justice Will Prevail, N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 8, 2011, at A27 (arguing that the mandate is constitutional).

4 See Tribe, supra note 3, at A27 (noting thatJustice Kennedy has been portrayed as the
"swing vote" in a closely divided Supreme Court). Compare Mead v. Holder, 766 F. Supp. 2d
16, 33-34 (D.D.C. 2011) (holding the individual mandate constitutional), and Thomas
More Law Ctr. v. Obama, 720 F. Supp. 2d 882, 893-95 (E.D. Mich. 2010), aff'd, 651 F.3d
520 (6th Cir. 2011) (same), with Florida ex rel. Bondi v. U.S. Dep't of Health & Human
Servs., 780 F. Supp. 2d 1256, 1295, 1298, 1305 (N.D. Fla. 2011), aff'd in part, rev'd in part,
648 F.3d 1235 (11th Cir. 2011) (holding the individual mandate and entire legislation
unconstitutional), and Virginia ex rel. Cuccinelli v. Sebelius, 728 F. Supp. 2d 768, 782, 78688 (E.D. Va. 2010), vacated 656 F.3d 253 (4th Cir. 2011) (holding individual mandate unconstitutional).
5 See, e.g., RUFUs DAvIS, THE FEDERAL PRINCIPLE: AJOURNEY THROUGH TIME IN QUEST

OF A MEANING 86-96 (1978) (describing the debate amongst the founding fathers over the
role of the federal government and noting the ambiguities that remained regarding the
roles of and relationships between the federal and state governments); see also Jonathan
Gruber, Covering the Uninsured in the United States, 46 J. ECON. LITERATURE 571, 572 (2008)
(noting that it is unclear whether the solution for improving health care access is more or
less federal government involvement).
6 See, e.g., James F. Blumstein & Michael Zubkoff, Public Choice in Health: Problems, Politics and Perspectives on FormulatingNational Health Policy, 4 J. HEALTH PoL. POL'Y & L. 382,
388 (1979) (noting the image of government as "provider of life-sustaining support" because the government has become more predominant in financing health services).

7 See, e.g., Pickert, supra note 2, at 48 (noting that "Democrats found themselves under
fire for backing a new expansion of federal entitlements").
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scribes as "opt-in federalism," the ACA permits individuals to choose, in
some respects, whether to be governed by federal or state rules. 8 Few if
any observers are acknowledging or seriously examining this important
development. This Article does both, and in closing considers the intriguing possibility that opt-in federalism will also be of use in addressing
the country's other multi-trillion-dollar question of "benefits," namely,
how to provide retirement income in an aging America. 9
The Article proceeds as follows:
Benefit law can be intimidating in its complexity and detail. Necessary to any disciplined discussion is an organizing theory that aids clear
thinking about benefit mechanisms and the legal rules governing
them. Part I offers a general theory of benefits that explains, broadly,
the role of individuals, government, and law in providing health care
and retirement income. 10
This Article identifies and explains three different models for providing citizens with health care and retirement benefits: the individual
reliance model, the multilateral bargain model, and the public entitlement model." The oldest and simplest model, the individual model,
relies on the individual's saved or current personal resources to address
retirement or heath care needs.1 2 The second model, the multilateral
model, relies on enforceable bargains between two or more players to
supply the beneficiary with retirement and health benefits. 13 The third
model, the public model, provides retirement and health care pursuant
8 See infra notes 223-339 and accompanying text.
9 Some may wonder why matters so different in character-retirement and healthare so often discussed together as "benefits" or "entitlements." The answer is not straightforward; in many ways they are so different that it is a conceptual mistake to treat them
similarly. See, e.g., Brendan Maher & Peter K. Stris, ERISA & Uncertainty, 88 WASH. U. L.
REV. 433, 451-64 (2010) (discussing the different nature of health and retirement promises). But legally they have been bundled together for decades; they occupy ajoined space
in the national dialogue on social and fiscal reform; and they undeniably share a heightened level of life significance for essentially everyone. As political scientist Jacob Hacker
put it, the study of America's retirement and health regimes is necessarily linked because
in both cases citizens' "life fortunes depend[] crucially on social benefits that they receive[] .... "JACOB S. HACKER, THE DIVIDED WELFARE STATE: THE BATTLE OVER PUBLIC
AND PRIVATE SOCIAL BENEFITS IN THE UNITED STATES 6 (2002). For reasons I explain in
Part I, this Article largely focuses on private benefit arrangements.
10 See infra notes 29-90 and accompanying text.
11 See infra notes 29-90 and accompanying text.
12 See Colleen Medill, The Individual Responsibility Model of Retirement Plans Today: Con-

forming ERISA Policy to Reality, 49 EMORY L.J. 1, 4 (2000); infra notes 34-46 and accompanying text.

1s See Maher & Stris, supra note 9, at 437-48 & 448 n.18 (describing the benefit tradeoff that is bargained for in employer-provided pensions and noting that benefits are "bargained for"); infra notes 47-75 and accompanying text.
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to entitlement promises made by the government as sovereign. 14 Most
societies rely on some combination of the three, including the United
States.
This conceptual scheme weaves together long-running threads of
benefit theory and tracks implicit fault lines in national benefit debates.
And the instrumental value of the taxonomy is significant. It clarifies at
what level a particular benefit debate is occurring and appropriately
frames legal and policy discussions. For example, my theory makes
clear that the ACA is a legislative endorsement of the bargain model in
the health benefit context. 15 That Congress should have instead chosen
an entitlement model is one type of criticism; that the ACA does a poor
job of improving health bargains is quite another. One can, and some
do, believe the former is true but not the latter. Moreover, as the theory
explains, that Congress has embraced the bargain model means that
particular care must be given to the selection of legal rules governing
the bargain players.
Part II draws upon my theory of benefits to explain important features of the pre-ACA benefit landscape in the United States. 16 To an
unusual degree, the United States has relied and continues to rely
upon private bargains to provide benefits to its citizens. 17 Perhaps
equally unusual, given the nation's professed admiration for federalism,
is that the American bargain model was heavily national. Via the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA),18 the nation
relied upon the federal government, and to a large degree federal
See, e.g., Patricia Dilley, TakingPublic Rights Private: The Rhetoric and Reality of Social Security Privatization,41 B.C. L. REv. 975, 979 (2000) (describing Social Security, an example
of the entitlement model); infra notes 76-90 and accompanying text.
15 ACA is not exclusively about bargains; for example, it also expanded Medicaid,
14

which is an entitlement program. But a central feature of the legislation is that it embraced

the bargain model for the vast majority of those not already eligible to participate in an
entitlement program. See infra notes 29-90 and accompanying text.
16 See infra notes 91-222 and accompanying text.
17 SeeJohn Bronsteen, Brendan S. Maher & Peter K. Stris, ERISA, Agency Costs, and the
Future of Health Care in the United States, 76 FORDHAM L. REv. 2297, 2298-99 (2008) (noting
that private health insurance is the "cornerstone" of U.S. health care); infra notes 96-129
and accompanying text.
18 Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829.
Easily the most thorough and fascinating account of ERISA's political history was written
by Professor James Wooten. See generallyJAMES A. WOOTEN, THE EMPLOYEE RETIREMENT
INCOME SECURITY ACT OF 1974, A POLITICAL HISTORY (2004). ERISA was expected to be a
landmark reform statute, but its ultimate effects were larger than even its drafters imagined. See 29 U.S.C. § 1001 (2006) (stating the purpose of the Act); Maher & Stris, supra
note 9, at 435 (describing ERISA as a "landmark statute"); infra notes 91-122 and accompanying text.
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judges, to select the legal rules that govern most benefit bargains. 19 ERISA's specific legal rules have been sharply criticized, but, for many reasons, there has been little opportunity to meaningfully reform America's benefit bargain regime. 20 Part II closes by examining ERISA's
shortcomings in the hopes of addressing the larger problems-what are
the optimal legal rules for benefit bargains and who should choose
those rules?-that have long challenged would-be reformers. 21
Part III examines an innovative solution to the problem: opt-in
federalism, namely, vertical regime choice by individuals. 22 The matter
is far from academic. Although the ACA is perhaps the most discussed
law in recent history, there has been little acknowledgment that the
legislation in theory instantiates a form of regime competition by permitting legal rule choice regarding the health bargain. 23 It does that by
creating an accessible individual health insurance market, and, in significant part, by allowing employed individuals who purchase insurance
on this individual market to partially opt-out of federal law and into
state law.24

Whatever the ACA's imperfections, the theoretical appeal of opt-in
federalism is strong. 25 Opt-in federalism is likely to maximize individual
preferences, promote desirable evolution of legal rules, restore to the
states their traditional function of regulating important aspects of local
insurance arrangements, and constructively accommodate uncertainty
and legitimate disagreement about what the optimal legal rules are.26
Although not without drawbacks, opt-in federalism is a promising approach to answering benefit questions in both the health care and retirement contexts. 27

19 See infra notes 130-179 and accompanying text. In 2010, most private health insurance
in America was supplied through employer-based (and thus overwhelmingly ERISA-governed) arrangements. See CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, SELECTED CBO PUBLICATIONS RELATED TO

HEALTH CARE LEGISLATION, 2009-2010, at 23 tbl.4 (2010), available at http://www.cbo.gov/
ftpdocs/120xx/doc12033/12-23-SelectedHealthcarePublications.pdf (indicating 150 million
people were covered through employer-based insurance in 2010).
20 See infra notes 180-222 and accompanying text.
21 See infra notes 180-222 and accompanying text.
22 See infra notes 223-329 and accompanying text.
23 See 42 U.S.C.A. § 18032(a) (1) (West Supp. 2011) (allowing individuals to choose in
which type of qualified health plan to enroll); infra notes 228-252 and accompanying text.
24 See infra notes 228-251 and accompanying text.
25 See infra notes 253-293 and accompanying text.
26 See infra notes 253-293 and accompanying text.
27 In many ways, retirement security is where health care was in the early 1990s: a
looming crisis with no consensus regarding the answer. Opt-in federalism, which leverages
the power of aggregative policymaking in an appealing way, see infra notes 223-329 and
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28
Vigorous challenges to the ACA have been mounted. Regardless
of the legislative or constitutional fate of the ACA, however, the legislation should be of enormous interest to observers concerned with retirement and health care in the twenty-first century and the division of
power between federal and state governments. It is a singularly useful
vehicle through which we can refine and modernize benefit theory; acknowledge the important role choice, uncertainty, and diversity play in
the selection of legal rules; and imagine additional reforms-whether
alternative or supplemental-that are rooted in notions of personal autonomy and local rulemaking. Should the ACA be legislatively modified
or held constitutionally invalid, whatever arises in its place would benefit
from a careful consideration of using opt-in federalist approaches to
answer fundamental but exceedingly difficult questions regarding
health and retirement law.

I. A

THEORY OF BENEFIT MODELS

For modern societies, the future is somewhat predictable. Whatever surprises lurk beyond the horizon, it is certain that there will be
citizens who age, can no longer work, and need replacement income. It
is equally inevitable that there will be citizens who fall ill, wish to get
care, and need to pay for treatment. 29 How can, and should, a society
allocate resources to address these inevitable contingencies?
This Article considers three models: the individual reliance model,
the multilateral bargain model, and the public entitlement model.30
accompanying text, may be a promising means to address retirement challenges that seem
beyond the reach of traditional solutions. See infra notes 330-334 and accompanying text.
28 See, e.g., Bondi, 780 F. Supp. 2d at 1295, 1298, 1305 (holding individual mandate and
entire legislation unconstitutional); Cuccinelli, 728 F. Supp. 2d at 782, 786-88 (holding
ACA's individual mandate unconstitutional); Barnett, supra note 3, at A19 (arguing that
the ACA is unconstitutional).
29 By "citizen," I imply no formal or legal meaning. I use it simply as a synonym for the
more cumbersome phrase "member of society."
30 See, e.g., Dilley, supra note 14, at 979 (describing Social Security, an example of the
entitlement model); Medill, supra note 12, at 4 (describing the individual model); Mark V.
Pauly, Making a Casefor Employer-Enforced Individual Mandates, HEALTH AFF., Apr. 1994, at
21, 24 (describing wage and benefit tradeoffs, a form of the multilateral bargain model).
There is a fourth model: the charity model, where an unaffiliated third party addresses
retirement or health needs out of eleemosynary impulses. See Nina J. Crimm, Evolutionary
Forces: Changes in For-Profitand Not-For-Profit Health Care Delivery Structures; A Regeneration of
Tax Exemption Standards, 37 B.C. L. REv. 1, 10 (1995) (describing pre-twentieth-century
health care as having many "hospitals for the poor" that were funded by charity rather
than patient fees). To be clear: charity care is different than care administered by a nonprofit organization. The former is a gift; the latter can be a gift, but often is pay-for-service,
where the "pay" portion is handled either by personal resources, insurance (a type of bar-
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Logically, to satisfy benefit needs, one can rely on oneself, other private
players, or the government. 31 The benefit models a society might adopt
correspond, respectively, to those three possibilities.32
Theorizing benefits in this way is useful. First, it makes intuitive
sense to organize benefit theory along the lines of who has responsibility for planning, stewarding, or conveying the benefits.3 3 Second, it
makes clear the nature and the magnitude of benefit disagreements.
Some disputes are arguments over which model is preferable in given
circumstances; others are about the ways in which a given model can be
improved. Third, and most importantly, it aids in the selection of optimal legal rules. Benefit rules cannot be appropriately imagined, proposed, researched, or assessed absent context.
For example, in using a benefit bargain model, a society is implementing important social policy through benefit arrangements which
impose binding obligations on private players. And obligations-the
negotiation, performance, and mediating thereof-come with behavior-altering costs. The intricate and uncertain assessment of those costs
is often the factor that determines what the optimal legal rules are. To
ignore the costs of shared responsibility-that is, to overlook the inherent complication of using bargains to solve allocation problems-is to
assume away a significant component of the challenge. Indeed, the difficulty of the task of selecting ideal benefit bargain rules is part of the
appeal of opt-in federalism.
gain), or the government. I do not discuss the charity model herein because neither the
current nor expected volume of charity benefits is significant compared to the other three
models. See, e.g., M. Gregg Boche, Health Policy Below the Waterline: Medical Care and the Cha-

ritable Exemption, 80

MINN.

L. REv. 299, 304-11 (1995) (describing, in the context of tax

exemption status, the evolution of nonprofit hospitals from primarily offering charity care
to offering pay-for-service care with little or no charity care); cf TEX. TAX CODE ANN.
§ 11.1801 (West 2010) (requiring only a modest percentage of care at tax-exempt hospitals
to be "charity care or government sponsored indigent care").
31 See Dilley, supra note 14, at 979; Medill, supra note 12, at 4; Pauly, supra note 30, at
24.
32 See Dilley, supra note 14, at 979; Medill, supra note 12, at 4; Pauly, supra note 30, at
24.
33 Scholars have surveyed the policy problems and insufficient financial outcomes that
imperil various retirement arrangements. See, e.g., Stephen F. Befort, The Perfect Storm of
Retirement Insecurity: Fixing the Three-Legged Stool of Social Security, Pensions, and Personal Sav-

ings, 91

MINN.

L. REV. 938, 962 (2007) (concluding that many American workers have in-

sufficiently saved for retirement). See generally Medill, supra note 12 (examining the policy
implications of employee saving). My focus is on arranging benefit models with reference

to both factual and legal responsibility; the latter is often overlooked, and thus insufficient
attention is paid to the content of the legal rules governing a particular benefit arrangement and how those rules should be chosen. Policy is important, but so is legal optimality.
Study by legal academics of the latter is crucial.
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This Part considers each of the three models below.
A. Benefit as IndividualReliance
The individual model is easy to conceptualize: the resources available to address retirement and health needs are those resources the
person in question has personally available to satisfy those needs at the
time the need arises.34 Such resources in effect consist of money saved,
whether it has been saved for a long time-in other words, what we traditionally think of as savings-or whether it is money recently earned or
acquired and then immediately transferred to address retirement or
health care needs, e.g., using current income to pay for health needs or
using a recent inheritance to provide retirement income. The latter
category of personal resources can, for present purposes, be constructively described as savings. After it is earned or otherwise falls within the
dominion of the player in question, it is "saved," i.e., not spent on
something else, for some arbitrarily small period of time before being
used to satisfy retirement or health needs.
A central attraction of the individual model is that it permits people to live by their preferences, wherever such preferences fall along
the continuum bounded on each end by Aesop's fabled grasshopper
and ant.35 Relatedly, the individual model rewards, and thus promotes,
careful and efficient thinking by individuals regarding the trade-off between current expenditures and saving resources for future needs; such
careful thinking may be appealing for economic or moral reasons, or
both, depending on one's perspective.36 Lastly, the individual model

34 See Medill, supra note 12, at 4. 1 consider the use of family resources to address such
needs to be "individual" resources.
3- See Bronsteen et al., supra note 17, at 2328 (2008) (noting the theoretical attractiveness of permitting employees to save "according to their risk and consumption preferences"). As for Aesop's insects, the industrious ant worked diligently and saved up food for
lean times; the carefree grasshopper failed to store food and suffered accordingly when
winter came. AESOP'S FABLES WITH A LIFE OF AESOP 121 (John E. Keller & L. Clark Keating trans., 1993). The fable has long illustrated the wisdom of planning and saving, and
the folly of failing to do so. See id.; see also, e.g., Dilley, supra note 14, at 976 (invoking Aesop
to illustrate opposing views regarding the provision of retirement benefits).
36 See, e.g., Edward J. McCaffery, Tax Policy Under a Hybrid Income-Consumption Tax, 70
Tx. L. REv. 1145, 1163 (1992) (collecting different historical authorities, from Aesop to
Thomas Hobbes to Benjamin Franklin, who have suggested saving is virtuous); Edward A.
Zelinsky, The Defined ContributionParadigm, 114 YALE L.J. 451, 522-23 (2004) (expressing
economic concerns about self-directed benefit savings but noting that this is consistent
with American cultural preferences for "individual ownership and control"); Martin Feldstein, Rethinking Social Insurance 2 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No.
11250, 2005) (making the economic observation that pension programs "depress saving").

20111]

The Benefits of Opt-in Federalism

1741

does not materially draw other players into the benefit calculus, and
thus avoids the nontrivial transaction, strategic, and litigation costs associated with shared responsibility.37
The shortcomings of the individual model are many. Most challenging is that many cannot save enough; that is, some segment of the
population simply does not earn enough today to save enough to maintain an acceptable standard of living and have sufficient resources to
deal with expected retirement and health needs.38 Other problems fall
into the "may not save enough" category. Individuals may lack the resources or training to appropriately plan for future needs, a problem
that may be exacerbated by cognitive distortions that affect the way in
which people engage in prediction and decision-making. 39 Considerable
behavioral economic evidence exists that suggests individuals are particularly susceptible to cognitive biases in the benefit setting.40 Third,
even assuming an expected benefit cost projection that a diligent, rational, and appropriately wealthy individual could save for, the variance
around such projections, particularly for health care, is too significant
for all but the wealthiest individuals to bear.41
3 See, e.g., Bronsteen et al., supra note 17, at 2299 (describing agency costs). Plans of
self-reliance do not give rise to obligations; bargains do. For this reason savings made pursuant to a fiduciary bargain are more usefully categorized under the multilateral model.
See infra notes 47-75 and accompanying text. It is frequently the transaction and indirect
costs associated with the legal rules governing multilateral obligations that explicitly or
implicitly determine the optimal legal rules.
38 See Medill, supra note 12, at 17 (noting that in one study, of those participants who
knew the maximum amount they could contribute to their 401(k) plans, less than half
contributed the maximum amount, and that inability to save was one of the top three reasons for opting not to contribute).
3 See RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: IMPROVING DECISIONS ABOUT
HEALTH, WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS 17-39 (2008) (discussing various systemic biases in

human thinking); see also Medill, supra note 12, at 3-4 (noting the difficulties that individuals face in retirement planning).
40 See Victor Ricciardi, The Psychology of Risk: BehavioralFinance Perspective, in 2 HANDBOOK OF FINANCE 85, 91-105 (Frank J. Fabozzi ed., 2008) (discussing cognitive biases in
retirement planning); see also Medill, supra note 12, at 14 (noting that "[m]any Americans
have a false sense of confidence as it concerns their own retirement"). See generallyJeffrey
B. Liebman & Richard J. Zeckhauser, Simple Humans, Complex Insurance, Subtle Subsidies (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 14330, 2008) (discussing biases
in the health insurance setting).
41 This is why even health arrangements that are sometimes described as "defined contribution" schemes, such as health savings accounts, are coupled with high deductible
health insurance (sometimes called "catastrophic" insurance). See Bronsteen et al., supra
note 17, at 2329-30; see also Melissa B. Jacoby, Teresa A. Sullivan & Elizabeth Warren, Rethinking the Debates over Health Care Financing:Evidence from the Bankruptcy Courts, 76 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 375, 389 (2001) (finding that medical debt played a causal role in a significant
percentage of bankruptcies); Amy B. Monahan, The Promise and Peril of Ownership Society
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It is uncontroversial to say that the individual model, standing
alone, is not a comprehensive benefit solution in contemporary times.
It adequately described American society during a time period when
much of society either did not retire,42 did not live a significant period
beyond retirement, or relied upon extended family for retirement
needs;43 a period when health care was overwhelmingly palliative (and
thus vastly less costly and variable) rather than curative;" and a period
when more complicated benefit arrangements simply did not exist.4 5
Importantly, however, the individual model is neither a historical
artifact nor lacking in modern usefulness. Traditional individual saving,
in particular, can and is an important and sometimes necessary part of
providing desirable answers to benefit questions. But it exists largely as
a supplement to, if not contained within, more sophisticated benefit
models.46 The next Section discusses these models.
B. Benefit as MultilateralBargain
The multilateral model is a bargain model, and by definition more
complicated and flexible than the savings model, because it involves at
least two players and frequently more. The animating principle behind
the multilateral model is that at To, the beneficiary-to-be gives up, directly or indirectly, something of value (most often foregone wages or
cash) for the legal right to receive services or resources from another

Health Care Policy, 80 TUL. L. REV. 777, 780-81 (2006) (discussing savings and insurance
arrangements in health care). As I explain, such arrangements are better conceived of as
multilateral bargains, given the considerable role of the insurer. See infra note 64.
42 W. ANDREW ACHENBAUM, SOCIAL SECURITY: VISIONS AND REVISIONs 105 (1986)
(explaining that "[a] s late as 1900, roughly two-thirds of all men over sixty-five were still
gainfully employed").
4 STEVEN A. SASS, THE PROMISE OF PRIVATE PENSIONS: THE FIRST HUNDRED YEARS 4-6
(1997).
4 The primitive nature of medicine prior to the early twentieth century meant by necessity much treatment was for comfort rather than cure. Cf. Joel D. Howell, Diagnostic
Technologies: X-Rays, Electrocardiograms,and CAT Scans, 65 S. CAL. L. REv. 529, 532-33 (1991)
(asserting that improvements in medical technology in the nineteenth and early-twentieth
centuries eventually permitted acute and curative intervention, rather than merely longterm care).
4 See SASS, supra note 43, at 1 ("Prior to 1900, today's vast and complex pensioning
apparatus existed in embryo only, and the elderly derived their livelihood from much simpler sources.").
4 See, e.g., Medill, supra note 12, at 11 (discussing the role of individual saving and
planning in 401(k) plans); Zelinksky, supra note 36, at 454 (noting that today's defined
contribution plans are mostly self-funded by an individual's contributions to an account);
infra note 64 (explaining how elements of multilateral plans resemble individual models).
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party, to address a later retirement or health need.47 Importantly, the
term "multilateral" rather than "bilateral" is used because many modern bargains involve players other than the direct parties to the bargain
who are both compensated for their work and who, practically speaking, are tied to the core bargain. 48
Given that involving others in benefit planning and conferral is
burdensome, the question arises: why do benefit bargains exist? Although benefit bargains come in wildly different varieties, in each case
the beneficiary's theoretical rationale for the bargain's appeal is that a
bargain is preferable to a self-reliance approach because the other party
to the bargain can provide some useful service-usually professional
expertise or the ability to bear risk-that the beneficiary cannot sufficiently provide on his own. 49 A brief look at three bargain types- pension, insurance, and fiduciary bargains-shows the practical appeal of
the multilateral model.
1. Traditional Pensions
A classic example of benefit as bargain is the traditional pension,
in which workers forego wages for the promise by the employer of retirement income for life, calculated according to a defined formula.5 0
Under the customary pension bargain, a worker trades current income

47 See Albert deRoode, Pensions as Wages, 3 AM. ECON. REv. 287, 287 (1913) (noting
that a "pension system" is paid for by "[foregone] wages"); Pauly, supra note 30, at 24 (describing wage and benefit tradeoffs). See generally Sherwin Rosen, The Theory ofEqualizing
Differences, in 1 HANDBOOK OF LABOR ECONoMics 641 (Orley Ashenfelter & Richard Layard
eds., 1986) (observing the "theory of equalizing differences" suggests higher non-wage
benefits will result in lower wages).
48 See Pauly, supra note 30, at 24 (describing wage and benefit tradeoffs). By other
players, I mean fiduciaries. See 29 U.S.C. § 1002(21)(A) (2006). The term "fiduciary" is
functionally defined to include any party who "has any discretionary authority or discretionary responsibility in the administration" of a plan. See id. A "plan" is ERISA's term for a
benefit bargain. See id.; infra note 91 and accompanying text. The bargain between the
employer and the employees in effect sweeps in fiduciaries, on whom ERISA relies heavily
to effectuate bargains. See 29 U.S.C. § 1002(21)(A) (defining "fiduciary"); Colleen E. Medill, The Law of Directed Trustees Under ERISA: A Proposed Blueprintfor the Federal Courts, 61
Mo. L. REv. 825, 828-35 (1996) (discussing the importance of fiduciaries in ERISA benefit
arrangements); see also infra note 60 (discussing fiduciary duties).
49 See David A. Hyman & Mark Hall, Two Cheersfor Employment-Based Health Insurance, 2
YALE J. HEALTH POL'Y L. & ETHIcs 23, 30 (2001) (noting that employers have superior
bargaining power than employees).
50 See deRoode, supra note 47, at 287 (noting that a "pension system" is paid for by
"[foregone] wages").
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for (1) clarity regarding the level of his future retirement income, 51 (2)
fiduciary care and investment expertise in the handling of the underlying assets supporting the promised income,5 2 and (3) reduced risk and
variance in connection with receiving the expected retirement income.5 3 Today such arrangements are called "defined benefit" pensions
and are heavily regulated under ERISA. 54
2. Fiduciary Bargains
Fiduciary bargains occur when the beneficiary party seeks to engage another party with comparatively superior capabilities to act with
heightened care in protecting or advancing the first party's retirement
and health interests. 55 More specifically, the deployment of the fiduciary's skill and the fiduciary's assumption of more exacting duties to the
beneficiary are intended to increase the likelihood that when the bene-

51 See Maher & Stris, supra note 9, at 452-55 (explaining that the aim of a "defined
benefit" pension is to provide precision as to the level of benefit to be received). A defined
benefit plan's tax qualification depends on the provision of "definitely determinable benefits." 26 C.F.R. § 1.401-1(b)(1)(i) (2010); see also Rev. Rul. 74-385, 1974-2 C.B. 130 (stating
that benefits are "definitely determinable" when calculated via a fixed formula and "not
within the discretion of the employer"); cf. Kathryn J. Kennedy, Conkright: A Conundrum
for Future Courts, an Opportunityfor Congress, in 2 NEW YORK UNIVERSITY REVIEW OF EMPLOYEE BENEFITS AND EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION 16-1, 16-65 to -68

(Alvin D. Lurie ed.,

2011) (discussing the statutory importance that pension benefits be determinable and not
subject to discretion of the plan administrator).
52 See, e.g. Daniel Fischel & John H. Langbein, ERISA's FundamentalContradiction: The
Exclusive Benefit Rule, 55 U. CHI. L. REv. 1105, 1112-20 (1988) (describing fiduciary duties
in benefit plans).
5s Cf. Jacob S. Hacker, The New Economic Insecurity-And What Can Be Done About It, I
HARv. L. & POL'Y REv. 111, 113 (2007) (concluding that Americans face increased economic insecurity in part because of the move away from traditional pensions toward individual savings-oriented retirement plans); Zelinsky, supra note 36, at 455-70 (discussing
several reasons why traditional pensions are less risky for employees than individual investment accounts). Professor Hacker recently achieved renown as the originator of the
"public option" for health insurance. See generally JACOB S. HACKER, CTR. FOR HEALTH,
ECON. & FAMILY SEC., U.C. BERKELEY SCH. OF LAW, THE CASE FOR PUBLIC PLAN CHOICE IN
NATIONAL HEALTH REFORM (2007), available at http://institute.ourfuture.org/files/acob_
HackerPublicPlanChoice.pdf?# (arguing for the creation of public health insurance to
compete with private health insurance providers).
'4 See 29 U.S.C. § 1002(35) (2006) (defining "defined benefit plan"). ERISA's regulation
of certain aspects of defined benefit pensions has been accurately described as "mindboggling" in its detail. See, e.g., Catherine L. Fisk, Lochner Redux: The Renaissance of LaissezFaireContract in the FederalCommon Law of Employee Benefits, 56 OHIO ST. L.J. 153, 167 (1995).
55 See Hyman & Hall, supra note 49, at 30. That the bargain is with the employer and
not directly with the fiduciary is not here relevant. The whole arrangement is best conceived of as a multilateral bargain.
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ficiary has a need for retirement or health resources, they will be available and timely conveyed to the beneficiary. 56
As mentioned above, a fiduciary bargain accompanies the traditional "defined benefit" pension arrangement. 57 In that setting, among
other things, the imposition of fiduciary duties on parties involved in
the pension bargain serves to promote responsible handling of the assets underlying the pension promise and to insure fair conveyance of
the benefits when due. 58
In addition, a fiduciary bargain is a crucial part of, and in many
circumstances arguably envelops, what are known today as "defined contribution" pension arrangements. 59 In a defined contribution retirement arrangement, an employer promises to contribute some amount
of money (whether deducted from the employee's wages or in the form
of a company "match" that is the functional equivalent of foregone wages) to an individual investment account administered by a fiduciary on
the beneficiary's behalf. 60
56 See Bronsteen et al., supra note 17, at 2307-09 (describing "asset risk" and "benefit
risk"). Asset risk is the possibility that available assets will be insufficient to satisfy the benefit promise. Id. at 2307-08. Benefit risk is the possibility that the promise will not be performed for some other reason. Id. at 2308-09. As I have in past work, I use the terms "benefit promise" and "benefit bargain" interchangeably.
s7 See 29 U.S.C. § 1104 (2006 & Supp. II 2008) (fiduciary duties); Fisk, supra note 54, at
167.
58 See supra note 48; see also Bronsteen et al., supra note 17, at 2307-09 (describing the
expectation that fiduciaries will properly manage funds and fairly confer benefits); Fischel
& Langbein, supra note 52, at 1113-19 (discussing fiduciary duties under trust law and
under ERISA).
5 29 U.S.C. § 1002(34) (2006) (defining a "defined contribution" plan). A defined
contribution plan effectively provides a participant with a "tax-preferred savings account[i]." Richard A. Ippolito, A Study of the Regulatory Effect of the Employee Retirement Income
Security Act, 31 J.L. & ECON. 85, 87 (1988). But these accounts are accompanied by significant duties on the part of plan fiduciaries. See 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a).
6 See Ippolito, supranote 59, at 87. Defined contribution accounts are subject to varying
degrees of control by the beneficiary, depending on the plan. See 29 U.S.C. § 1002(34) (defining defined contribution plan); 29 U.S.C. § 1104(c) (relaxing fiduciary duties where the
beneficiary exercises greater control over the plan); Susan J. Stabile, The Behavior of Defined
Contribution Plan Participants, 77 N.Y.U. L. REv. 71, 72 (2002) (noting that choices by participants in defined contribution plans are shaped by choices employers make regarding the
plan structure and operation and by legal requirements). Fiduciaries must satisfy duties of
loyalty, prudence, and investment diversification, and they must adhere to plan terms to the
extent such terms are consistent with ERISA. 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a); cf Maher & Stris, supra
note 9, at 458 n.124 ("For defined contribution plans that do not offer the option of investment self-direction, the promisor's fiduciary role is obvious and enormous: the fiduciary is
actively deciding how to invest assets beneficially owned by the plan participant.").
ERISA does provide an option for defined contribution plans to be structured to permit
various levels of beneficiary control of investments and concomitantly to reduce the fiduciary
duties owed by plan fiduciaries regarding investment losses. See 29 U.S.C. § 1104(c) (provid-
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Defined contribution plans are sometimes conceived of as pure
savings vehicles-and thus may seem more properly described as instances of the "individual" benefit model. In fact such accounts, under
ERISA, include as the default rule significant fiduciary promise(s) by
the plan fiduciaries with regard to investing and/or administering the
assets in the beneficiary's account. 61 There is little doubt that the cost
of securing the fiduciary bargain is nontrivial and reflects a material
role the fiduciary plays in the arrangement.6 2
3. Insurance
Private insurance is obviously a bargain.63 Consider health insurance: the insured pays premiums in exchange for the right to demand
transfer payments equivalent in value to "medically necessary" treatment.64 The premium reflects the expected cost of payments to the ining a "safe harbor" provision which relaxes fiduciary duties of prudence and diversification in
cases where participant exercises investment "control"); 29 C.F.R. § 2550.404c-1 (2010) (implementing regulations). Debates over the amount of residual fiduciary duties that remain in
such circumstances are ongoing. See Hecker v. Deere & Co., 556 F.3d 575, 589-90 (7th Cir.
2009) (discussing scope of fiduciary duties under section 1104(c) and disagreeing with the
view of the Department of Labor); DiFelice v. U.S. Airways, Inc., 497 F.3d 410, 418 n.3 (4th
Cir. 2007) ("[The] safe harbor provision does not apply to a fiduciary's decisions to select
and maintain certain investment options within a participant-driven 401(k) plan."); DOL
Opinion Letters, PWBA Declined to Issue Advisory Opinion Regarding Whether Nonqualified Plan Was
Pension Plan in Effect, Pens. Plan Guide (CCH) 1 19,987, at n.1 (Mar. 6, 1998) .(opining that
the selection of an investment menu by the plan administrator is beyond beneficiary control); see also infra note 334. Plan structuring that truly renders de minimis the duty and liability of the fiduciary approaches a self-reliance benefit approach. See supra notes 34-46 and
accompanying text (describing the individual model).
61 See 29 U.S.C. § 1104; supra note 60 and accompanying text.
62 Although the benefit bargain is in some sense "struck" between the employer and
the employee, the bargain is only in practice possible to the extent some players agree to
serve as fiduciaries and be compensated accordingly. Fiduciary willingness thus serves as a
driver of bargain terms.
63 Insurance obtained through an employer is financed by compensation reduction,
although most workers probably do not recognize this fact. See Alan B. Krueger & Uwe E.
Reinhardt, The Economics ofEmployer Versus Individual Mandates, HEALTH AFF., Apr. 1994, at
34, 40 (suggesting that workers are less aware of health insurance financed by "gradual
reductions in pay raises" than by direct individual payment).
64 In practice, insurance always includes a small self-reliance element: insurance policies include deductibles and co-insurance requirements, which are to be funded by the
insured's savings ("savings" including, as I have explained, current income transfer), rather than by the insurer. See Mark V. Pauly, The Economics of Moral Hazard: Comment, 58 AM.
EcON. REv. 531, 535-37 (1968) (offering the classic explanation of the utility of deductibles and coinsurance). These payments by the individual are intended to reduce "moral
hazard," or the tendency of lowered costs of medical care to the insured to increase the
insured's use of medical services. Id. at 535. But essentially this use of savings is part of the
bargain struck between the insurer and the insured, and still falls within the bounds of the
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sured during the coverage period and a "loading cost" (the amount the
insurance company charges for running the insurance company and
writing policies).65 The traditional explanation as to why insurance is
attractive is that individuals are risk averse; they prefer certain outcomes to outcomes with equivalent expected value but higher variance. 66 In the health insurance context, few people are willing to bear
the risk that an unlikely-to-be-needed but extraordinarily expensive
treatment could exhaust or exceed their savings, even if the expected
value of that risk is small. 67 Accordingly, risk-averse individuals are willing to pay the insurance company's loading cost (and more) to the extent that such cost is less than the amount they are willing to pay to
avoid great variance in their expected costs. 68 An additional financial
justification for insurance is that, even for risk-neutral insureds, the insurance company has superior buying and negotiating power with medical services providers. 69
The multilateral model shares a problem with the individual model: some people simply do not have enough income today to save or

multilateral model, because the insurer has a significant portion, indeed the majority, of
the responsibility for overall health needs.
65 REXFORD E. SANTERRE & STEPHEN P. NEUN, HEALTH ECONOMICS: THEORIES, IN-

SIGHTS, AND INDUSTRY STUDIES 149 (2009) (explaining the loading fee). The expected
cost portion of the insurance premium can be thought of as the "actuarially fair" or "pure"
premium and the remaining premium as the price of insurance. Id.
6 See Kenneth J. Arrow, Uncertainty and the Welfare Economics of Medical Care, 53 AM.
ECON. REv. 941, 959 (1963) (describing individuals as "normally risk-averters" in his discussion of the theory of ideal insurance, and noting that "[t] his assumption may reasonably be taken to hold for most of the significant affairs of life for a majority of people
67 Arrow, supra note 66, at 959-61 (explaining the theoretical health insurance calculus). Professor Arrow's paper is widely considered to be a foundational work in the field of
health economics.
6 See Pauly, supra note 64, at 531-32 (explaining that individuals prefer health insurance
up to a certain premium that is not actuarially fair, over self-insurance); Mark V. Pauly, Competition in Health InsuranceMarkets, LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS., Spring 1988, at 237, 239 (explaining that insureds, when buying health insurance, are in part buying the "traditional riskspreading function of insurance"). Professor Pauly is credited with effectively describing, in
the early 1990s, the individual mandate as a means to permit the use of market solutionsi.e., bargains-rather than entitlements to solve the health insurance coverage problem. See
Julie Rovner, Republicans Spurn Once-Favored Health Mandate, NPR, (Feb. 15, 2010), http://
www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=123670612; see also Pauly, supra note 30, at
21 (describing the appeal of the individual mandate in ensuring insurance coverage).
69 See Pauly, supra note 68, at 254-55 (explaining that group insurance, by having a larger market share, can be used to extract discounts from medical service providers); see also
Hyman & Hall, supra note 49, at 30 (noting that employers have superior bargaining
power than individual employees).
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bargain for enough to satisfy tomorrow's needs.70 That aside, the multilateral model is theoretically attractive because it combines the appeal
of individual action with comparative advantage. The result is that benefit outcomes the individual could not or would not have achieved on
his own can be achieved through the involvement of other parties. A
central difficulty with the bargain model is that real-life bargains suffer
from bargaining differentials, motive problems, and strategic play.71
Deals struck between parties of different bargaining strength may not
reflect truly fair exchanges; employment and insurance bargains have
long attracted particular scrutiny in this regard.72 Finally, the party to
the arrangement that agrees to provide something-for example, the
risk-sharer, the fiduciary, or the investment expert-is motivated by
personal gain. 73 This is not a moral criticism, merely recognition that
the profit motivation may result in the striking of certain bargainswhether they are per se "unfair" or not-that insufficiently serve the
nation's retirement and health care goals.

74

The shortcomings of the multilateral model present a strong case
for government regulation of benefit bargains, whether in the form of
statutory, judicial, or administrative rules. 75 In the two landmark benefit
statutes of the past half-century, ERISA and the ACA, that is precisely
70 See Medill, supra note 12, at 17; supra notes 38-41 and accompanying text (discussing the fact that many people cannot save enough money in the individual model of bene-

fits).
71 See, e.g., Maher & Stris, supra note 9, at 472-73 n.201. This observation is, to put it
mildly, not new. But it enjoys distinguished company. See Roscoe Pound, Liberty of Contract,
18 YALE L.J. 454, 454 (1909) (declaring that "actual industrial conditions" undermine the
appeal of "freedom of contract" theories).
72 See, e.g., Roscoe Pound, Do We Need a Philosophy of Law?, 5 COLUM. L. REv. 339, 34446 (1905) (decrying the failure of common law principles to appreciate bargaining differentials in employment and criticizing "freedom of contract"justifications to void protective
statutes). The first use of the term "contract of adhesion" to appear in a legal academic
journal appeared in an article discussing life insurance. See Edwin W. Patterson, The Delivery of a Lfe-Insurance Policy, 33 HARV. L. REv. 198, 222 (1919) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
73 See Bronsteen et al., supra note 17, at 2306 (noting that ERISA permits an employer to
employ or control a fiduciary); cf Peter Diamond, Organizing the Health InsuranceMarket, 60
ECONOMETRICA 1233, 1234 (1992) (noting that in the health care setting, a doctor serves as
both a provider of health care advice and a provider of health care services).
74 See Maher & Stris, supra note 9, at 472-73 n.201.
71 Cf. Friedrich Kessler, Contracts ofAdhesion-Some Thoughts About Freedom of Contract, 43
COLUM. L. REv. 629, 629 (1943) (describing the rise of standard commercial contracts and
the need for legal rules to appropriately police their use). Professor Kessler's article focused on contracts of adhesion, but the insights translate to an argument for contextvariant protective legal rules in a variety of settings. Id. at 642 ("[F]reedom of contract
must mean different things for different types of contracts."). A contract, of course, is simply a form of bargain. See id. at 630.
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what happened. To that this Article will return. But first, the following
Section briefly considers the third benefit model.
C. Benefit as PublicEntitlement
Benefit as entitlement is a model that allocates resources for retirement and health pursuant to direct political promises made by the
sovereign and paid for via the public treasury.76 The benefit-entitlement
model differs from the individual and multilateral models in that benefit-entitlement approaches do not aim to "promote" adequate savings
77
and bargains to address retirement and health needs. Instead, they
78
aim to have the sovereign itself pay the bills. Social Security and Medicare are classic examples of benefit-entitlement approaches in retirement and health care, respectively.79 In my model, the defining feature
of an entitlement is that the arrangement is fundamentally a political
act.80
The appeal of a benefit-entitlement model is a particularly complicated inquiry. The sovereign is an utterly different actor than either
individuals making savings decisions or parties striking a commercial

76

See, e.g., Dilley, supra note 14, at 979 (describing Social Security as a "public entitle-

ment").

See id.
I consider government financial support, i.e., tax expenditures, of a particular individual or multilateral benefit arrangement to be analytically distinct from entitlement
models; you cannot push a rope. In that way tax expenditures to support voluntary arrangements are very different than direct government provision of benefits. Tax expenditures to promote certain benefit arrangements are enormously important, but beyond the
scope of this paper. As a simplifying assumption, unless I note otherwise, I assume
throughout-a patently false assumption-that all benefit arrangements are tax-neutral,
not because that is realistic, but because it allows clear conceptual thinking before considering the effects of tax distortions.
79 See Dilley, supra note 14, at 979 (referring to Social Security as a "public entitlement"
to future income).
80 Certainly, one can imagine "entitlement" as meaning many different things. For example, one view may be that an entitlement is an unconditional moral right; under that
definition, Social Security is not an entitlement, because it has conditions. For my purposes, however, the defining feature of an entitlement is that the government, as sovereign, is making a promise. That act is motivated by political considerations, not economic
self-interest, and thus implicates an entirely different host of considerations than those
implicated by private actors making what are essentially self-interested financial decisions.
To the extent the government is acting more like a private actor than a sovereign, such as
when it acts as an employer, then the benefit arrangement is more accurately conceived of
as a bargain. Public employee benefit arrangements, however, involve a host of unique
considerations that are beyond the scope of this Article. See, e.g., Paul M. Secunda, Constitutional Contracts Clause Challenges in Public Pension Litigation, 28 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMp. L.J.
263 (2011).
7?

78
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benefit bargain. 81 The sovereign has unique power to tax, borrow,
spend, punish, and make law; is motivated by something other than
profit; and, in purely economic terms, has more risk-tolerance and purchasing power than any private player or collection of private players. 82
This presents both advantages and disadvantages, depending on the
specific context in which an entitlement model is used and one's foundational assumptions about the "correct" level of sovereign involvement
in society (in either specific or broad terms).83
The modern political consensus (although that is today being
challenged in some quarters) is that the entitlement model is, at least,
the appropriate way to provide retirement and health care for those
unable to have saved or bargained their way there.84 Beyond that, the
appeal and appropriateness of an entitlement model inspires heated,
sometimes febrile, debate. For example, a sovereign's enormous resources and risk-tolerance have long been invoked to justify public
health insurance; 85 conversely, a sovereign's susceptibility to cronyism
and unresponsiveness to market pressures have long been cited as
countervailing reasons to disfavor public health insurance. 86 That debate has been resolved differently in other countries. 87
In America, the current political environment suggests no epic
expansion of the benefit as entitlement approach is in the foreseeable
future. Quite the opposite: proposals to reform Social Security seek to

81 See generally Dilley, supra note 14 (comparing private and public retirement plans in
discussing the debate over the privatization of Social Security).
82 Cf id. at 981-82, 1035 (arguing that public entitlement is more likely to satisfy retirement needs than private savings and noting that it is designed to "protect the public
interest in social stability").
83 See, e.g., Gruber, supra note 5, at 572 (noting the debate over whether more or less
government involvement is the proper response to improving health care access). See generally Dilley, supra note 14 (discussing the debate over whether to privatize Social Security
and the reasoning on each side of the debate).
84 But seeJeremy Binckes, Tea Party Leader: We Should Abolish Social Security, HUFF POST
POL. (Mar. 31, 2010, 11:50 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/03/31/tea-partyleader-we-shouln_519970.html (suggesting the elimination of Social Security).
85 See, e.g., F.A. HAYEK, THE ROAD TO SERFDOM: TEXT AND DOCUMENTS 148 (Bruce

Caldwell ed., 2007) (noting the appeal of a "comprehensive system of social insurance" to
deal with "sickness"). I do not offer an exhaustive recitation or endorsement of the arguments in favor of entitlement, of course. There are many and they vary in quality.
86 See, e.g., Blumstein & Zubkoff, supra note 6, at 398-99 (discussing advantages of
nongovernmental approaches to cost-containment in the health care context). I do not
offer an exhaustive recitation or endorsement of the arguments against the entitlement
model, of course. There are many and they vary in quality.
87 See Gruber, supra note 5, at 571 (noting that the United States has a high number of
uninsured citizens, in contrast to other countries that guarantee universal health care).
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reduce, rather than expand, the breadth and depth of the program.88
And Congress, in passing the ACA, rejected both the creation of a
"Medicare for All" health program and multiple versions of a "public
option," where the government would have offered need-subsidized
health insurance to those who chose to acquire insurance directly from
the government. 89
Instead, health care reform took a different tact: through use of a
mandate to obtain insurance, the federal government has essentially
compelled people to make bargains. 90 The result of this hotly-contested
compulsion, as this Article discusses later, is to create a legal metastructure in which individuals and states could in some (but not all)
respects have more effective say in shaping the legal rules that affect
the health insurance bargain than they did prior to the ACA's enactment. To understand this increase in the power of individuals and
states, we must look at the primary pre-ACA hurdle to individual and
state power in the benefit context: ERISA.
II. ERISA

AND THE RISE OF THE BARGAIN MODEL

ERISA contains multitudes. There is no need here to plumb most
of its specifics. Any thoughtful discussion of benefit law and policy,
however, must necessarily recognize and understand two of the statute's
central characteristics.
First, ERISA federally regulates bargains-more specifically, employment-based benefit bargains 91-at a level that markedly limits state
88 See generallyDilley, supra note 14 (discussing the recent interest in privatizing Social Security). President Obama recently appointed a bipartisan commission to propose solutions to
the nation's budget woes. A portion of the commission's final proposal was to reduce Social
Security expenditures and increase reliance on "personal retirement savings." NAT'L COMM'N
ON FISCAL RESPONSIBILITY & REFORM, THE MOMENT OF TRUTH 48-56 (2010), available at
http://www.fiscalcommission.gov/sites/fiscalcommission.gov/files/documents/TheMomentofTruthl2_1_2010.pdf (proposing Social Security reform).
89 See Ezra Klein, Death of the Public Option, WASH. PosT (Dec. 15, 2009, 12:14 AM),
http://voices.washingtonpost.com/ezra-klein/2009/12/the_death_of the-public-option.
html (discussing death of the public option as a political possibility). Single-payer proposals, such as Representative John Conyers's proposed bill, got even less political traction
than the public option. See United States National Health Care Act, H.R. 676, 111th Cong.
§ 205 (2009) (single payer scheme).
90 See 26 U.S.C.A. § 5000A (West 2011) (effective Jan. 1, 2014) (requiring individuals to
maintain minimal essential coverage to avoid payment of tax penalty); infra notes 228-252
and accompanying text.
91 ERISA regulates "any employee benefit plan" established by an employer or employee organization. See 29 U.S.C. § 1003(a) (2006). A benefit plan is defined as "an employee welfare benefit plan or an employee pension benefit plan or a plan which is both
an employee welfare benefit plan and an employee pension benefit plan." Id. § 1002(3).
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regulation. Indeed, to a considerably higher degree than most federal
statutes, it reposes exclusive rulemaking authority in the federal government. 92 Second, ERISA heavily relies upon the federal judiciary to
fill in statutorily unresolved matters of law and policy. 93 In this regard,
the bench's efforts have received sparse praise. 94 ERISA's ultimate re95
sult has been a set of legal rules of vast reach that please few. The statute's shortcomings shed light on more attractive alternatives.

A. Federalizingthe BargainModel
ERISA was enacted by the ninety-third Congress and signed into
law on Labor Day 1974.96 It was conceived and enacted in an era that
favored centralized solutions. 97 Business conglomerates were still in vo-

gue, 98 and even leading Republican politicians were unafraid to invoke
federal power to address social challenges. Consider President Richard
M. Nixon, for example. By the time of ERISA's passage, he had already
99
resigned in disgrace over Watergate. Prior to his fall, however, he (and

The pension plan definition encompasses both "defined benefit" and "defined contribution" retirement arrangements. Id. § 1002(2). The welfare plan definition encompasses
health insurance. Id. § 1002(1). That ERISA is conceived of in terms of regulating "plans"
is not important for this Article's purposes; one can think of an ERISA plan as an ERISA
bargain or promise, and vice versa. In practical effect, ERISA governs all health and retirement bargains struck at the workplace. See Peter J. Wiedenbeck, ERISA's Curious Coverage, 76 WASH. U. L.Q. 311, 311-12 (1998). Exceptions to ERISA's coverage are limited in
scope. See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. § 1003(b)(1)-(5) (specifying enumerated and narrow exceptions).
92 See 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (ERISA preemption provision).
93 See Norman Stein, ERISA and the Limits ofEquity, LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter
1993, at 71, 110.
94 See infra notes 130-222 and accompanying text.
95 See, e.g., Donald T. Bogan, ProtectingPatient Rights DespiteERISA: Will the Supreme Court
Allow States to Regulate Managed Care, 74 ThL. L. RiEv. 951, 953 (2000) (arguing that "ERISA has failed ... miserably to serve as a beneficial consumer protection statute for ERISA
welfare plan participants"); Bronsteen et al., supra note 17, at 2315-16 (criticizing ERISA's
role in generating increased agency costs in the health care setting); Fischel & Langbein,
supra note 52, at 1105-07 (noting various criticisms of ERISA and arguing that ERISA fiduciary law belongs "on the list of ERISA's major blunders").
96 See WOOTEN, supra note 18, at 1.
97 See, e.g., Lewis B. Kaden, Politics, Money, and State Sovereignty: The JudicialRole, 79 CoLUM. L. REv. 847, 847 (1979) (noting that the period from 1936 to 1976 reflected an appetite for national solutions to social problems).
98See, e.g., Brian Cheffins & John Armour, The Eclipse ofPrivateEquity, 33 DEL. J. CORP.
L. 1, 26 (2008) (observing that conglomerates were a "familiar" part of the landscape in
the 1970s).
99 See Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat.
829 (enacted on Sept. 2, 1974). Nixon resigned in August 1974. See JOAN HOFF, NIXON
REcONSIDERED 338 (1994).
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other leading Republicans) either implemented or favored federal solutions to many national problems, including wage and price controls,
a reduction of the speed limit, and the creation of the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency and the Occupational Safety and Health
Administration. 100 Indeed, Jacob Javits, a Republican Senator from New
York, was the primary force behind ERISA's enactment.1 01
Prior to 1935, the United States did not have a broad-based public
retirement system. 102 By the late-nineteenth century, however, various
private industry players had concluded that offering pensions-what
today we would call "defined benefit" pensions 103-were attractive for
business reasons, and even moral ones.1 04 Accordingly, different companies offered retirement arrangements that varied in their substantive
terms, depending upon business- and market-specific factors.
100 See HOFF, supra note 99, at 1-144 (discussing Nixon's domestic policies); see also
Bruce Ackerman, Interpreting the Women's Movement, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 1421, 1428 n.15
(2006) ("Nixon supported the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and other Great Society legislation
. . . ."). Of course, whatever the possible wisdom of Nixon's policies, history will have other
good reasons to judge him harshly.

101 See generally WOOTEN, supra note 18 (offering a detailed political history of ERISA
and explaining Senator Javits's pivotal role in drafting and passing ERISA).
102 Social Security was enacted in 1935. ANN SHOLA ORLOFF, THE POLITICS OF PENSIONS: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF BRITAIN, CANADA, AND THE UNITED STATES, 1880-

1940, at 13 (1993). In Europe, Germany had the first broad public pension system, established by Otto von Bismarck in 1889. See Axel B6rsch-Supan, Anette Reil-Held & Reinhold
Schnabel, Pension Provision in Germany, in PENSION SYSTEMS AND RETIREMENT INCOMES
ACRoSS OECD COUNTRIES 160, 162 (Richard Disney & Paul Johnson eds., 2001). Other
European countries followed. See ORLOFF, supra, at 14 tbl.1.1 (listing the years in which
various European countries, Britain, and the United States first adopted old age insurance
laws). In contrast, "the United States and Canada ... were 'laggards' in the institution of
modern [pension] programs relative to the European countries . . . ." Id. at 13.
103 See supra note 54.
104

See

SASS,

supra note 43, at 1-2. Private pensions, although not common, began to

arise in the late-nineteenth century.
PENSIONS

ALICIA

H.

MUNNELL,

THE ECONOMICS OF PRIVATE

8 (1982) (describing early private pension arrangements, such as the one of-

fered by American Express in the 1870s); see also DAN MCGILL ET AL., FUNDAMENTALS OF
PRIVATE PENSIONS 16-20 (9th ed. 2010) (discussing early private sector pensions). By the
1930s, approximately "[ten] percent of the nonagricultural labor force . . . were employed
by corporations offering pension plans, although not all employees were eligible for plan
membership." MUNNELL, supra, at 8 (citing MURRAY W. LATIMER, INDUSTRIAL PENSION
SYSTEMS IN THE UNITED STATES AND CANADA 42-48 (1932)).
For a discussion of the economic appeal of pensions, see Maher & Stris, supra note 9,
at 447 (explaining the economic attraction of pensions). Some believed pensions for elderly workers-after long careers of hard work-were morally appropriate. See, e.g., MCGILL
ET AL., supra, at 6, 20 (explaining that many employers were "not willing to discard longtenured faithful employees" without pensions and that "[a]t first, private pension benefits
were universally regarded as gratuities from a grateful employer in recognition of long and
faithful service").
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Troubles arose. Whatever the merit of leaving private actors to negotiate pension terms, in many instances workers' pension expectations
were frustrated; companies made unfair, unclear, or insecure pension
promises with unacceptable frequency. 105 These problems with traditional pensions impelled ERISA's enactment. 106 Importantly, at the time
of ERISA's conception, pension bargains were by far the dominant employment benefit bargain in the United States: the value of assets committed to pension promises dwarfed the assets attributable to defined
contribution or health insurance employment bargains. 107 Thus many
of ERISA's legal rules-actuarially sound funding requirements, vesting
limitations, government guarantees-were aimed directly at pension
bargains and applied only to them. 108 In short, the ninety-third Congress, in enacting ERISA, was trained on solving a pension problem,
not a benefits one.
ERISA, however, covers much more than pensions.1 09 With narrow
exceptions, it regulates all workplace benefit bargains.110 That includes
employment-based health insurance, which in the early 1970s was considered a modest "fringe benefit" of employment rather than the costly
bugbear it is in 2011.111 Employment health insurance had taken hold
during World War II as a response to wage controls that limited employers' ability to compete for workers using wage increases." 2 In the post105 See, e.g., WOOTEN, supra note 18, at 51 (noting that when Studebaker Corporation
closed its auto production plant in 1963, its pension plan did not contain enough funds to
meet its obligations, and that some commentators believe the Studebaker fund failed because "company officials misused plan funds"). For example, reformers were troubled by
harsh forfeiture rules. See, e.g., Menke v. Thompson, 140 F.2d 786, 790 (8th Cir. 1944)
(dealing with an employee with a 45-year tenure who was denied his pension because he
participated in a strike years before). Another problem was performance risk: that an employer would fail to properly manage or preserve the assets underlying the promise: See
WOOTEN, supra note 18, at 51. Employees expecting pensions after years of work were told
that there was no money to pay them. See id. at 51-79.
106 Medill, supranote 12, at 4.
107 See, e.g., Stabile, supra note 60, at 74 (discussing the dominance of traditional defined benefit pension as retirement income in 1974, when ERISA was enacted).
108 See Medill, supra note 12, at 4. See generally Wiedenbeck, supra note 91 (discussing
the differing categories of ERISA rules).
109 See Medill, supra note 12, at 4.
110 See supra note 91 and accompanying text.
III See Maher & Stris, supra note 9, at 437 (defining "fringe benefit" as "any nonwage
item of value provided by an employer to an employee"); supra note 91 and accompanying
text.
112 See Clark C. Havighurst, American Health Care and the Law, in THE PRIVATIZATION OF
HEALTH CARE REFORM: LEGAL AND REGULATORY PERSPECTIVES 1, 3 (M. Gregg Bloche ed.,
2003). Prior to World War II, "[tihe vast majority of care was purchased directly by consumers out-of-pocket on a fee-for-service basis in the private market place." William D.
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war period, health insurance became an increasingly popular benefit. 1 3
At the time of ERISA's passage, the content and cost of employmentbased health insurance was not a primary concern for Congress, because "there was no crisis in health plans in 1974."114 Nonetheless, it was

an employment-based benefit, and there were scattered reports of abusive practices.1 15 In the general spirit of reformist enthusiasm, but with
far less careful thought than had gone into the specifics of pension regulation, Congress subjected workplace health insurance to ERISA's dominion.1 16
Unlike the many precise rules governing pension arrangements,
ERISA offered very few specific rules governing health promises.11 7 Instead, the primary federal rules governing health bargains were rules of
general applicability to all benefit bargains: rules of obligation, of duty,
of notice, and of remedy.118 Many of these rules took the form of "standards," as opposed to classic legal rules, and thus left to the judiciary
capacious authority and responsibility.' 19

White, Market Forces, Competitive Strategies, and Health Care Regulation, 2004 U. ILL. L. REv.
137, 141 (citing I.S. FALK ET AL., THE COSTS OF MEDICAL CARE 8-9 (1933)). World War II

&

wage controls encouraged employers to offer health insurance, which they increasingly did
in the post-war period. See Havighurst, supra, at 3-4.
113 See Havighurst, supra note 112, at 3.
114 Michael S. Gordon, Introduction to the Second Edition: ERISA in the 21st Century of EmPLOYEE BENEFITS LAw, at lxiii, lxvii-lxix (Steven J. Sacher et al. eds., 2d ed. 2000). Some
commentators and policymakers were expressing concern about rising health expenditures in general, but 1970s legislative proposals for national health insurance reform failed
in Congress. See generallyFlintJ. Wainess, The Ways and Means ofNational Health Care Reform,
1974 and Beyond, 24J. HEALTH POL. POL'Y & L. 305 (1999) (discussing failed 1970s health
reform efforts).
115 See Gordon, supra note 114, at lxix.
116 See 29 U.S.C. § 1002(1) (2006) (extending ERISA coverage to welfare plans); cf
Fisk, supra note 54, at 165-66 (explaining that Congress gave "relatively little thought" to
welfare benefits); Hyman & Hall, supra note 49, at 29 ("Health benefits were included in
ERISA as an afterthought . . . .").
117 See Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat.
829.
118 See infra notes 130-179 and accompanying text.
"9 See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(B) (2006) (describing the general standard of care
as that of a prudent person familiar with the benefit plan matters at issue). "[C]lassic
'rules' are legal directives that, in objectively discernable circumstances, impose determinate results. Classic 'standards' are legal directives that, in circumstances possessing a certain character, authorize a range of consequences sensitive to situational facts." Maher
Stris, supra note 9, at 441-42 (collecting authorities regarding the rule versus standard
distinction); see also infra notes 130-179 and accompanying text. In this Article, when discussing legal rules, I mean both classic rules and classic standards, unless context suggests
otherwise.
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In contrast to the significant authority conferred upon the federal
judiciary, ERISA sharply preempted the authority of states to regulate
employee benefit bargains.1 20 ERISA explicitly preempts, by statutory
provision, the ability of states to make law that "relates to" benefit
plans.1 21 Whatever the boundary of that vast provision, ERISA then
"saves" to the states the authority to pass general laws of insurance.1 22
Finally, ERISA "deems" any employee benefit plan not to be an insurance company, and thus forbids states from regulating any employee
benefit plan that is self-insured.1 23 Self-insured plans cannot be regulated even by means of "saved" laws. 124

120 See 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a). ERISA preemption case law and commentary is labyrinthine at best and incoherent at worst. A coherent and readable recent treatment is that of
Professor Wiedenbeck. See PETER J. WIEDENBECK, ERISA: PRINCIPLES OF EMPLOYEE BENEFIT LAw 245-49 (2010).

121 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) ("[ERISA] shall supersede any and all State laws insofar as they
may now or hereafter relate to any employee benefit plan [governed by ERISA]"). In 1995,
the Court backed away from its earlier, expansive interpretation of this clause. N.Y State
Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co., 514 U.S. 645, 654-55
(1995) (noting a rebuttable presumption against preemption in its interpretation of section 1144(a)'s "relate to" language).
122 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b) (2) (A) (saving from preemption state laws that regulate insurance). This provision is called the "savings" clause, for obvious reasons. See id.
123 Id. § 1144(b) (2) (B) (stating that employee benefit plans shall not be "deemed" insurance companies subject to state regulation). This provision is called the "deemer"
clause. See id. A self-insured plan is one where the plan itself, rather than any insurer, is
directly obligated to pay benefits to the beneficiaries. See Paul O'Neil, Protecting ERISA
Health Care Claimants: PracticalAssessment of a Neglected Issue in Health Care Reform, 55 OHIo
ST. L.J. 724, 735 (1994).
124 See 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b) (2) (A). Thus, insured and self-insured plans are treated differently. Compare FMC Corp. v. Holliday, 498 U.S. 52, 65 (1990) (holding that the regulation of a self-insured plan is preempted because it does not qualify under ERISA savings
clause), with Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724, 758 (1985) (holding that
state regulation of benefit plan's insurer is not preempted because it qualifies as a "law
which regulates insurance" under the ERISA savings clause). Neither type of plan can be
directly regulated by states. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a). However, "insurance companies selling
health care insurance policies (and, thus, indirectly the policy benefits to plan participants) are subject to regulation by state insurance laws." Colleen E. Medill, HIPAA and Its
Related Legislation: A New Role for ERISA in the Regulation of Private Health Care Plans, 65
TENN. L. REv. 485, 492 (1998). Conversely, the deemer clause bars states from using general insurance law to regulate self-insured plans. See 29 U.S.C § 1144(b) (2) (B). The distinction matters "because most employers self-insure their welfare plans, which means that
state efforts to regulate and reform health care are largely ineffective." Troy Paredes, StopLoss Insurance, State Regulation, and ERISA: Defining the Scope of FederalPreemption, 34 HARV. J.
ON LEGIs. 233, 243 (1997). But see infra note 127 (discussing the regulation of stop-loss
insurers that many self-insured plans use).
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In addition to explicit preemption, the courts have also read ERISA to preempt certain state laws implicitly.125 Thus, even if a state law

were outside the reach of ERISA's enumerated preemption provisions,
under this line of preemption reasoning, state laws that sufficiently frustrate or conflict with ERISA's purpose would be preempted.12 6
The result is a regulatory scheme in which the effective level of
federal displacement of state authority varies from "very significant" to
"absolute," depending on the plan structure and the state law at issue.127 In any event, the combination of ERISA's explicit and implicit
125 See 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a); Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila, 542 U.S. 200, 217-18 (2004)
("Under ordinary principles of conflict pre-emption, then, even a state law that can arguably be characterized as 'regulating insurance' will be pre-empted if it provides a separate
vehicle to assert a claim for benefits outside of, or in addition to, ERISA's remedial
scheme.")
126 See 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a); Aetna, 542 U.S. at 217-18.
127 An interesting wrinkle is that most self-insured plans actually rely on outside insurance called "stop-loss" insurance to offload risk. See Amy B. Monahan, Federalism, Federal
Regulation, or Free Market? An Examination of Mandated Health Benefit Reform, 2007 U. ILL. L.
REv. 1361, 1372-73 (describing stop-loss insurance). Payments above a certain amount are
covered by the stop-loss insurer; easily triggered stop-loss policies are functionally little
different from a traditionally insured plan. See id. "ERISA fails to clearly define the scope of
federal preemption of states' attempts to regulate self-insured plans with stop-loss coverage." Jeffrey G. Lenhart, ERISA Preemption: The Effect of Stop-Loss Insurance on Self-Insured
Health Plans, 14 VA. TAx REv. 615, 616 (1995). The circuit courts of appeals are split over
the degree to which ERISA preempts stop-loss plan regulation, although the majority view
is that state regulation is preempted. Paredes, supra note 124, at 251-60 (discussing the
circuit split). Compare Tri-State Mach., Inc. v. Nationwide Life Ins. Co., 33 F.3d 309, 315
(4th Cir. 1994) (holding that a plan covered by stop-loss insurance is self-insured for ERISA preemption purposes and thus is exempt from indirect state insurance regulation),
with Mich. United Food & Commercial Unions v. Baerwaldt, 767 F.2d 308, 311-13 (6th Cir.
1985) (holding that a plan covered by stop-loss insurance is "insured," and the stop-loss
provider is thus subject to state insurance regulation). The Supreme Court has not resolved the question. Cf Russell Korobkin, The Battle over Self-Insured Health Plans, or "One
Good Loophole Deserves Another," 5 YALE J. HEALTH POL'y L. & ETHIcs 89, 110-12 (2005)
(arguing that state regulators can use the "savings clause" to directly regulate stop-loss
insurance companies).
To summarize: States cannot regulate self-funded plans. See supra note 124. Some but
not all circuit courts have held that states cannot regulate nominally self-funded plans that
use stop-loss insurance. Many plans are either purely self-funded or self-funded and use
stop-loss insurance. As a result, a significant number of employment-based health insurance is provided in such a way to be beyond the reach of state regulatory power. Thus,
many employers have been in effect able to opt out of state authority.
Of course, employers are not individuals and have different reasons to choose law. Society will get different legal rules, and serve different values, if law is being driven by employer choice rather than individual choice. A notable feature that the meta-structure the
ACA contemplates, and a significant part of its theoretical appeal, is vertical regime choice
by individuals. In addition, when individuals choose state law under the ACA, they do not
drag employers with them, as employers essentially do to employees when they choose
federal law under ERISA. In other words, to the degree the ACA empowers individuals to
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preemptive power has severely constrained states from engaging in additional or supplemental state regulation of benefit bargains. 128 Commentators have extensively criticized both ERISA's preemptive scheme
and the judicial interpretation of it. 129
B. Judicializingthe BargainModel
Congress left considerable work to the judiciary in giving content
to ERISA's flexible statutory standards. 130 Key judicial tasks include fleshing out rules of obligation, interpretation, review, and remedy.131 These
issues have drawn the attention of the Supreme Court on a regular basis.132 They are very important because they define the particulars of

&

make choices about law, it also partners them with a player who ex ante agrees with that
choice. See infra notes 223-329 and accompanying text.
128 See 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a). "ERISA preemption has thwarted [health] reform efforts in
a large number of states." Catherine L. Fisk, The Last Article About the Language of ERISA
Preemption?A Case Study of the Failure of Textualism, 33 HARV. J. ON LEGIs. 35, 36 (1996); see
also Bogan, supra note 95, at 996 ("ERISA super-preemption ... harms millions of workers
by nullifying a myriad of state health care consumer protections."); Margaret G. Farrell,
ERISA Preemption and Regulation of Managed Health Care: The Casefor Managed Federalism, 23
AM. J.L. & MED. 251, 252 (1997) (describing a regulatory void where states cannot regulate
and the federal government has not regulated). But compare Retail Indus. Leaders Ass'n v.
Fielder, 475 F.3d 180, 183 (4th Cir. 2007) (holding that the Maryland "pay or play" health
insurance scheme preempted), with Golden Gate Rest. Ass'n v. City of San Francisco, 546
F.3d 639, 642 (9th Cir. 2008) (holding that the San Francisco "pay or play" law not preempted).
129 See, e.g., O'Neil, supra note 123, at 727-38 (criticizing ERISA preemption). See generally Jay Conison, ERISA and the Language of Preemption, 72 WASH. U. L.Q. 619 (1994)
(same).
130 See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a) (1) (2006) (the "exclusive benefit rule"); Fischel
Langbein, supra note 52, at 1110 (criticizing the exclusive benefit rule for sweeping too
broadly); Stein, supra note 93, at 110 (explaining that ERISA left open questions for the
courts to answer).
131 See Stein, supra note 93, at 110.
132 See generally, e.g., Hardt v. Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co., 130 S. Ct. 2149 (2010)
(reviewing whether, under ERISA, a claimant for attorney's fees and costs must first be a
"prevailing party"); Conkright v. Frommert, 130 S. Ct. 1640 (2010) (reviewing whether a
plan administrator's error in interpreting a plan justifies denying the administrator deference for later interpretations of the plan); Kennedy v. Plan Adm'r for DuPont Sav. & Inv.
Plan, 555 U.S. 285 (2009) (reviewing an ERISA plan administrator's interpretation of the
documents governing the plan); Metro. Life Ins. v. Glenn, 554 U.S. 105 (2008) (reviewing
what considerations a reviewing court should consider in determining whether a plan
administrator abused its discretion in denying benefits under an ERISA plan); LaRue v.
DeWolff, Boberg & Assocs., Inc., 552 U.S. 248 (2008) (reviewing a plan participant's rights
to remedy under ERISA for fiduciary breaches that impaired the value of plan assets in a
participant's individual account).
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private enforcement, on which ERISA relies significantly to shape conduct in the first instance and provide relief in the case of wrongdoing. 133
Before considering the Court's decisions, recall the stage. ERISA
does not require any employer to provide benefits; it only regulates
promises voluntarily made. 134 Of course, legal rules that make benefit
arrangements clearer or more secure come with an expected price
(and some level of uncertainty around that expected price). Increased
cost and uncertainty associated with understanding, complying with, or
litigating a particular rule has a potentially chilling effect: it may deter
employers from offering benefits in the first place, or it may result in
less generous offers being made. 135 ERISA's regulatory approach inherently involves a tradeoff between benefit security, clarity, and cost.136

There is no doubt that Congress, in enacting ERISA, was well
aware that it was increasing the cost of striking benefit bargains. 137 The
challenge is resolving precisely how much security and clarity are to be
prioritized over cost.1 38 To the extent the statute does not plainly an-

swer that question in a given setting, how should statutory ambiguity or
silence be resolved? In important areas-fiduciary status, plan interpretation, judicial review, and remedy-the Court has tended to choose
legal rules that prioritize cost and volatility reduction over benefit security.139 It has done so either by raising the threshold requirement for
court intervention or limiting the relief available.14 0
133 Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 52 (1987) ("The civil enforcement
scheme of § 502(a) is one of the essential tools for accomplishing the stated purposes of
ERISA.").
134 Lockheed Corp. v. Spink, 517 U.S. 882, 887 (1996) ("Nothing in ERISA requires
employers to establish employee benefits plans. Nor does ERISA mandate what kind of
benefits employers must provide if they choose to have such a plan.").
135 See Brendan S. Maher, Creatinga PaternalisticMarketfor Legal Rules Affecting the Benefit
Promise, 2009 Wis. L. REv. 657, 659.
136 See Maher, supra note 135, at 659 (discussing the policy tradeoff inherent in ERISA); Paul M. Secunda, Sorry, No Remedy: Intersectionality and the Grand Irony of ERISA, 61
HASTINGS L.J. 131, 133 (2009) (arguing that the Court has prioritized cost reduction over
protecting beneficiaries, contrary to congressional wishes).
137 See Maher & Stris, supra note 9, at 435 (explaining that rules that provide security
and clarity increase cost).
138 See, e.g., Conkright, 130 S. Ct. at 1648-49 ("We have therefore recognized that ERISA
represents a careful balancing between ensuring fair and prompt enforcement of rights
under a plan and the encouragement of the creation of such plans.") (citation omitted)
(internal quotation marks omitted); Dana M. Muir, The Plan Amendment Trilogy: Settling the
Scope of the Settlor Doctrine, 15 LAB. LAw. 205, 213 (1999) (noting the "inherent tension"
between protecting participants and encouraging plan sponsorship).
139 See, e.g., LaRue, 552 U.S. at 250-51 (limiting fiduciary remedy); Hughes Aircraft Co.
v. Jacobson, 525 U.S. 432, 443-45 (1999) (narrowing the definition of "fiduciary" through
the settlor doctrine); Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 108-15 (1989)
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1. Obligations
Many of ERISA's protections hinge upon the status of the alleged
bad actor as a fiduciary.141 In a series of cases in the 1990s, the Court
narrowed the functional definition of "fiduciary" by announcing what is
known as the "settlor doctrine."142 Where an actor is designing, amending, or terminating a plan, those actions are not fiduciary actions, but
rather "settlor" actions that do not trigger ERISA's fiduciary provisions. 143 The rationale was that employers who created or amended
plans were acting akin to the settlor of a trust, who historically could act
freely in fashioning the trust.1" The word "settlor" does not appear in
ERISA;145 the settlor doctrine is a judge-made concept that reflects the
conclusion that key aspects of the benefit bargain are matters of business discretion in which neither ERISA nor the courts should interfere. 146
(holding that a court should use an arbitrary and capricious standard to review a fiduciary's decision of when a plan awards the fiduciary discretion).
10 See LaRue, 552 U.S. at 250-51; Hughes, 525 U.S. at 443-45; Firestone, 489 U.S. at 10815.
141 See 29 U.S.C. § 1002(21) (2006) (defining "fiduciary"); id. § 1104(a)(1)(A)(i) (imposing traditional trust law duty of loyalty on fiduciaries); supra note 48 (identifying and
describing fiduciary definitions in ERISA); see alsoJohn H. Langbein, What ERISA Means by
"Equitable":The Supreme Court's Trail of Error in Russell, Mertens, and Great-West, 103 CoLUM. L. REV. 1317, 132.5 (2003) ("ERISA subjects all significant aspects of plan administration to fiduciary duties and remedies derived from trust law. . . .").
142 See, e.g., Hughes, 525 U.S. at 443-45; Lockheed, 517 U.S. at 890-91; Curtiss-Wright
Corp. v. Schoonejongen, 514 U.S. 73, 81-82 (1995).

143 See Hughes, 525 U.S. at 443-45; Lockheed, 517 U.S. at 890-91; Curtiss-Wright,514 U.S.
at 81-82. The decisions in Hughes, 525 U.S. at 443-45, Lockheed, 517 U.S. at 890-91, and
Curtiss-Wright, 514 U.S. at 81-82, all address the scope of the settlor doctrine. There are
modest limits in ERISA regarding plan formation or amendment. See, e.g., 29 U.S.C.
§ 1102(b) (3) (2006) (requiring the establishment of procedure for amending a plan).

14 See Hughes, 525 U.S. at 443-45; Lockheed, 517 U.S. at 890-91; Curtiss-Wright, 514 U.S.
at 81-82.
145 See Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat.
829.
146

See Hughes, 525 U.S. at 443-45; Lockheed, 517 U.S. at 890-91; Curtiss-Wright, 514 U.S.

at 81-82. The settlor doctrine is not clearly foreclosed by the statute's text, has policy appeal, and may very well express congressional intent. Although the doctrine has merit,
influential commentators have criticized the Court's reasoning. See, e.g., Dana M. Muir,
FiduciaryStatus as an Employer's Shield: The Perversity of ERISA FiduciaryLaw, 2 U. PA. J. LAB.
& EMP. L. 391, 425-26 (2000) (describing and criticizing the settlor doctrine); Marilyn J.
Ward Ford, Broken Promises: Implementation of FinancialAccounting StandardsBoard Rule 106,
ERISA, and Legal Challenges to Modification and Termination of PostretirementHealth Care Benefit

Plans, 68

ST. JOHN's

L. REv. 427, 446-50 (1994) (arguing, in advance of the settlor doc-

trine cases, that "postretirement health care benefit plans" were intended to be protected
by ERISA). The point, however, is merely that the Court's creation of the doctrine has
reduced the reach of ERISA's fiduciary provisions. See, e.g., Pegram v. Herdrich, 530 U.S.
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2. Deference
Fiduciaries administer all benefit plans pursuant to written instru147
In 1989, in Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, the U.S. Supreme Court held that if a plan by its terms awards a fiduciary discretion in administering the plan, then when reviewing the fiduciary's
conduct, the Court will use an "arbitrary and capricious" standard.1 48
Unless the fiduciary acted unreasonably, the court will defer to its
judgment.1 49 Predictably, plan drafters thereafter included such discretionary provisions as a matter of course. 150
The Court's lenient standard worried commentators because ERISA does not prohibit the use of fiduciaries who are employed or controlled by the employer (to the contrary, it is commonplace). 151 Many if
not most fiduciaries who enjoy judicial deference labor under some level of conflict, and various scholars have expressed concern about biased
plan administration. 152 The Court remains enthusiastic about its deferential mode of review and has declined opportunities to change
course.15 3 In two recent decisions, the Court held that the arbitrary and
capricious standard is appropriate notwithstanding either (1) the presence of a stark conflict-for example, where the fiduciary construing
the terms of the bargain is the same insurance company paying out
claims-or (2) an instance of prior unreasonable conduct by the administrator-for example, where earlier in the benefit dispute, the adminisments.

211, 226-30 (2000) (holding that choosing to structure a plan as a health maintenance
organization is not a fiduciary act, nor is a mixed eligibility and treatment decision). But see
Aetna, 542 U.S. at 218 (holding that a benefit determination is "generally a fiduciary act").
147 See supra note 48 and accompanying text (explaining that fiduciaries administer
plans); supra note 91 and accompanying text (explaining that plans are benefit bargains).
148 See 489 U.S. at 108-15 (articulating the standard of review in benefit determination
cases).
14 Id. at 111-14.

150 See, e.g.,

MICHAEL

J. CANAN &

WILLIAM

D.

MITCHELL, EMPLOYEE FRINGE AND WEL-

591 (1997) (discretionary clause in model welfare plan); John H.
Langbein, The Supreme Court Flunks Trusts, 1990 SUP. CT. REV. 207, 220 (predicting insertion of discretionary clauses in plans); 2 Pens. Plan Guide (CCH) ¶ 30,047 (illustrating a
model defined benefit plan with a discretionary clause).
151 See 29 U.S.C. § 1108(c) (3) (2006); Fischel & Langbein, supra note 52, at 1126 (noting that plan sponsors "routinely" select fiduciaries from the "ranks of management").
152 See Bronsteen et al., supra note 17, at 2304-19 (arguing that conflicted fiduciaries
threaten fair delivery of health care); John H. Langbein, Trust Law as Regulatory Law: The
Unum/Provident Scandal and Judicial Review of Benefit Denials Under ERISA, 101 Nw. U. L.
REV. 1315, 1316 (2007) ("Most ERISA plan benefit denials are the work of conflicted decisionmakers.").
153 See, e.g., Conkright, 130 S. Ct. at 1644; Glenn, 544 U.S. at 110-19.
FARE BENEFIT PLANs
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trator behaved unreasonably. 154 In each opinion, the Court stressed the
appeal of resolving benefit disputes without judicial intervention.1 55
3. Remedies
ERISA provides multiple remedies to beneficiaries wronged under
the statute or the governing plan. Three cover the overwhelming majority of ERISA disputes. 156 The first is a "benefits" remedy designed to
allow beneficiaries to obtain benefits that were promised but not
paid; 157 the second is a "fiduciary" remedy designed to police inappropriate fiduciary behavior;1 58 and the third is a "catch-all" remedy designed to afford "appropriate equitable relief' in case of a violation of
ERISA or the terms of the governing plan.1 59 Each remedy bears significant Court-imposed limitations. 160
The benefits remedy has been interpreted to include only the value of the benefit that was not properly conferred.161 For example, in
the case of a medical treatment held to have been wrongfully denied
under the terms of the plan, the plaintiff's recovery would be limited to
the value of the benefit withheld; consequential damages to make the
plaintiff whole for physical or financial injuries suffered as a result of

154 See Conkright, 130 S. Ct. at 1644 (holding that a deferential review can survive mistake); Glenn, 554 U.S. at 110-19 (confirming application of the arbitrary and capricious
standard in cases of conflict, but noting that a review should consider the "circumstances"
of the conflict).
15s Conkright, 130 S. Ct. at 1650; Glenn, 554 U.S. at 116.
156 See 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a) (1) (B) (2006) (benefits remedy); id. § 1132(a) (2) (fiduciary
remedy); id. § 1132(a) (3) (B) (catch-all remedy).
15 See id. § 1132(a)(1)(B).
158 See id. § 1132(a) (2).
15 See id. § 1132(a)(3)(B); see also Maher & Stris, supra note 9, at 465 (noting that the
Supreme Court has "exploited textual ambiguity" in ERISA by "developing several restrictive 'judicial glosses'").
160 See, e.g., LaRue, 552 U.S. at 250-51 (limiting the fiduciary remedy); Sereboffv. Mid
At. Med. Servs., Inc., 547 U.S. 356, 361-62 (2006) (limiting the catch-all remedy); GreatW. Life & Annuity Ins. Co. v. Knudson, 534 U.S. 204, 210 (2002) (same); Mertens v. Hewitt
Assocs., 508 U.S. 248, 256-61 (1993) (same); Mass. Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S.
134, 148 (1985) (limiting the benefits remedy).
161 See 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a) (1) (B); Russel, 473 U.S. at 148.

[T] he relevant text of ERISA, the structure of the entire statute, and its legislative history all support the conclusion that in § 409(a) Congress did not intend to provide, and did not intend the judiciary to imply, a cause of action
for extracontractual damages caused by improper or untimely processing of
benefit claims.
Russell, 473 U.S. at 148.
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the wrongful denial are not available.16 2 Nor are punitive damages
available.163
The fiduciary remedy-which polices fiduciary breaches, the core
malfeasance ERISA was conceived to deter-has been interpreted to
apply only in limited situations: when a fiduciary's misconduct has resulted in a loss to the plan or a gain to the fiduciary.164 Yet fiduciary
misconduct can occur, and cause injury, when neither the plan is hurt
nor the fiduciary advantaged. 165 Indeed, the text of the fiduciary provision seemingly contemplates circumstances other than plan injury or
fiduciary gain in which a court might provide relief. 166 As a result of the
162 Russell, 473 U.S. at 148. The 1985 Supreme Court case of Mass. Mutual Life Ins. Co.
v. Russell in fact involved a section 1132(a) (2) claim, but its limit on "extracontractual"
damages has widely been interpreted by courts and commentators to apply to section
1132(a) (1) (B) benefit claims. See id.; see, e.g., Richard A. Epstein & Alan 0. Sykes, The Assault on Managed Care: Vicarious Liability, ERISA Preemption, and Class Actions, 30 J. LEGAL
STUD. 625, 632 (2001) (observing that "consequential damages are not allowed"). This has
been passionately criticized. See, e.g., George Lee Flint, Jr., ERISA: ExtracontractualDamages
Mandatedfor Benefit Claims Actions, 36 ARiz. L. REv. 611, 647 (1994) (referring to consequential damage limits as "pure fiction-caused either by vicious judicial and legal subterfuge or, more likely, gross judicial and legal malpractice on the part of [the] Supreme
Court").
163 Peter K. Stris, ERISA Remedies, Welfare Benefits, and Bad Faith: Losing Sight of the Cathedral, 26 HOFSTRA LAB. & Emp. L.J. 387, 394-95 (2009) (noting the absence of consequential and punitive damages under ERISA).
'- See 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a) (2); LaRue, 552 U.S. at 254 (noting that the fiduciary remedy
was intended to protect a plan's financial integrity and that a plaintiff who receives all
benefits to which she was entitled under a plan, although late, is not eligible for relief under ERISA's section 1132(a) (2)). In the 2008 Supreme Court case of LaRue v. DeWolff,
Boberg, & Associates, Inc., the beneficiary allegedly lost money as a result of plan administrators failing to follow his investment instructions. 552 U.S. at 250-51. At issue was whether
the fiduciary remedy was triggered. Id. at 250. The Court's decision assumed there was a
fiduciary breach and held relief available, but only because it held there was a loss to the
plan. See id. at 252-53. Were the fiduciary remedy not constricted, it would have applied
regardless of whether the plan suffered a loss. See id.; see also Russell, 473 U.S. at 142 ("A fair
contextual reading of the statute makes it abundantly clear that its draftsmen were primarily concerned . . . with remedies that would protect the entire plan, rather than with the
rights of an individual beneficiary.").
165 See,. e.g., Farr v. U.S. W. Commc'ns, Inc., 151 F.3d 908, 911 (9th Cir. 1998) (finding
that misrepresentation in the form of bad tax advice hurt the beneficiary, but was not remediable because the misrepresentation neither injured the plan nor benefitted the fiduciary).
'- See 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a) (2). Any fiduciary who breaches any of the fiduciary duties
imposed by ERISA

shall be personally liable to make good to such plan any losses to the plan resulting from each such breach, and to restore to such plan any profits of such
fiduciary which have been made through use of assets of the plan by the fiduciary, and shall be subject to such other equitable or remedial relief as the
court may deem appropriate, including removal of such fiduciary.
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narrow interpretation of the fiduciary remedy, however, lower courts
have struggled to handle situations in which a clear fiduciary breach
has occurred but the "plan loss" or "fiduciary gain" triggering conditions are not present. 167
Limitations on the first two remedies might be of little consequence if the third remedy, the "catch-all" remedy, was interpreted expansively.168 The opposite is true. 169 In a series of decisions, the Supreme Court has held that the catch-all remedy is burdened by a significant constraint.1 70 The relief available under the catch-all remedy is
limited to the relief "typically available" in historicalequity, that is, in the
days of the divided bench. 171 Roughly, a plaintiff in the twenty-first century seeking relief under the catch-all remedy is limited to the equitable relief of the nineteenth. 172 What the latter entails precisely is disputed, but according to the Court it only very rarely, if ever, includes
relief resembling traditional consequential damages.173
The aggregate effect of the Court's work has been to use narrower
obligations, lenient interpretative and review standards, and highly circumscribed remedies to reduce the judiciary's role in policing employment benefit bargains. 174 Commentators, unable to square the
Court's decisions with notions of ERISA as a protective statute, with the
doctrinal skeleton of trust law, or with traditional interpretativemethodological frames, have criticized the Court's jurisprudence. 175
29 U.S.C. § 1109(a).

167 See, e.g., Farr, 151 F.3d at 911 (holding that bad tax advice is not remediable under
ERISA, notwithstanding the existence of a fiduciary breach).
16
See 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a) (1) (B), (a) (2), (a) (3)(B).
169 See id. § 1132 (a) (3) (B).
170 See, e.g., Sereboff, 547 U.S. at 361-62; Knudson, 534 U.S. at 210; Mertens, 508 U.S. at
256-61.
171 See Sereboff 547 U.S. at 361; Knudson, 534 U.S. at 210; Mertens, 508 U.S. at 256-61; see
also Langbein, supranote 141, at 1348-63 (discussing Mertens and Knudson).
172 See Sereboff, 547 U.S. at 361; Knudson, 534 U.S. at 210; Mertens, 508 U.S. at 256-61.
173 Mertens, 508 U.S. at 256 (holding that equitable relief refers to "those categories of
relief that were typically available in equity [and] not compensatory damages"); see also
Langbein, supra note 141, at 1318-19 (explaining that the Court wrongly held for equitable relief to exclude monetary relief); cf Judith Resnik, ConstrictingRemedies: The Rehnquist
Judiciary, Congress, and FederalPower, 78 IND. L.J. 223, 231-71 (2003) (discussing at length
the Court's interpretation of "equitable relief" and the difficulties with the Court's position). Happily, the Court's view may be changing. In the recently decided Cigna Corp. v.
Amara, the Court concluded that historical equity, and thus ERISA, permitted remedies,
such as "surcharge," which are functionally similar (though not identical) to claims for
consequential damages. See 131 S. Ct. 1866, 1880 (2011).
174 See LaRue, 552 U.S. at 250-51; Hughes, 525 U.S. at 443-45; Firestone, 489 U.S. at 10815; supra notes 130-179 and accompanying text.
175 See supra notes 35, 48, 52, 128, 129, 136, 146, 150 and accompanying text.
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Many of those criticisms, certainly, have merit. Yet, in terms of offering
a persuasive account of why the Court has done what it has done-as
well as laying bare fundamental problems with the current way modern
benefit law is conceived-a realist approach offers the most promise.
As I have explained elsewhere, the Court's decisions evidence acute
fear of legal rules that could undermine the frequency and generosity of
bargains, not only because Legal Rule A will have a significant expected
cost, but also because there will be significant variance around the expected cost of Legal Rule A.1 76 More bluntly, what the Court has done
with respect to ERISA bargains-which govern the delivery of trillions of
dollars of retirement income and health care in this country-is to have
largely succumbed to a particular policy judgment. 17 7 It has decided that
the cost and volatility associated with the traditional level of judicial involvement in private disputes is unacceptably high and would undermine the ERISA benefit model. 178 Instead, the Court has articulated
constrictive legal rules that-by sharply limiting the role of courts in defining and policing ERISA bargains-reduce the cost and uncertainty
associated with making benefit promises.1 79
C. Criticizingthe ERISA BargainModel
The ways in which ERISA allocates power regarding the law of benefit bargains-to the federal government and, then, in significant measure, to federal judges-are structurally unappealing. ERISA, in effect,
lashes much of the country's benefit rules to a single federal mast in a
ship captained by judges. 180 It is a classic piece of anti-federalism. 181 The
appeal of an alternative approach, opt-in federalism, is discussed be-

low. 182 But before considering the alternative, it is necessary to consider
in some detail why ERISA is in many respects a failure. 18 3

176

See Maher & Stris, supra note 9, at 464-73.

177 See, e.g., LaRue, 552 U.S. at 250-51; Hughes, 525 U.S. at 443-45; Firestone, 489 U.S. at
108-15.
178 See, e.g., LaRue, 552 U.S. at 250-51; Hughes, 525 U.S. at 443-45; Firestone, 489 U.S. at
108-15.
179 See, e.g., LaRue, 552 U.S. at 250-51; Hughes, 525 U.S. at 443-45; Firestone, 489 U.S. at
108-15; see also Maher & Stris, supra note 9, at 435 (noting the tradeoff in legal rules).
180 See Stein, supra note 93, at 110 (noting that ERISA left open questions for the courts
to resolve).
181 See Richard B. Stewart, Federalismand Rights, 19 GA. L. REV. 917, 917 (1985) (noting
that "[flederalism seeks to maintain political decentralization").
182 See infra notes 253-293 and accompanying text.
183 See Bogan, supra note 95, at 953 (noting that "ERISA has failed ... miserably").
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Consider first the Supreme Court's work.184 Many observers, including dissenting members of the Court, believe the Court has been
185
materially unfaithful to Congress's protective intent. Congress clearly
prioritized benefit security and clarity over minimizing costs; that is why
it enacted ERISA. 186 To be sure, legal rules that are extraordinarily costly or extremely volatile (such as punitive damages), might have been
outside of Congress's protective intent because they come at too high
of a price. 187 Under this thinking, the most intuitively sensible framework to adopt, given the statute's history and expressed "security" purpose, is that when balancing concerns of security and cost, courts
should use a rebuttable presumption favoring security.188 Such runs
squarely counter to the Court's pattern of decisions. 189
I am sympathetic to this line of reasoning and believe it to be
largely correct. 190 But the true question is more difficult than the binary one of whether the Court has been faithful or not, with the only
possible answers being "yes" or "no." The reality is that Congress, in expressing itself, fell short of perfection. In several crucial respects, the
federal legislature had only the vaguest of intents, conflicting intent, no
specific intent at all, or an intent that judges address certain matters
through the development of common law.1 91 The consequence is that
courts, including the Supreme Court, have been forced into a policy92
making role in which they face numerous institutional disadvantages.1
184 See, e.g., LaRue, 552 U.S. at 250-51; Hughes, 525 U.S. at 443-45; Firestone, 489 U.S. at
108-15.
185 See Knudson, 534 U.S. at 224-34 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (concluding that Congress did not intend the "catch-all" provision to be limited by the Court's historical equity
test); Secunda, supra note 136, at 133. See generally Langbein, supra note 152 (arguing that
the Supreme Court failed to implement congressional intent).
18 See 29 U.S.C. § 1001(b) (2006) ("It is hereby declared to be the policy of [the Act]
to protect interstate commerce and the interests of participants in employee benefit plans
and their beneficiaries . . . ."). The statute, after all, has the word "security" in its title.
187 See Mertens, 508 U.S. at 270 (White, J., dissenting) (concluding that Congress did
not intend for punitive damages to be recoverable under the "catch-all" remedy).
I- See 29 U.S.C. § 1001(b).
189 See, e.g., LaRue, 552 U.S. at 250-51; Hughes, 525 U.S. at 443-45; Firestone, 489 U.S. at
108-15.
190 See Bronsteen et al., supra note 17, at 2304-19; Maher, supra note 135, at 669-82;
Maher & Stris, supra note 9, at 464-73.
11 See Stein, supranote 93, at 110.
192 See Patsy v. Bd. of Regents, 457 U.S. 496, 513 (1982) (observing that when "the relevant policy considerations do not invariably point in one direction, and there is vehement
disagreement over the validity of the [relevant] assumptions . . . [t]he very difficulty of
these policy considerations, and Congress' superior institutional competence to pursue
this debate, suggest that legislative not judicial solutions are preferable"). And scholars
have recently begun to explore the degree to which judicial "cognitive illiberalism" may
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That they may have done a poor job does not change the fact that they
were dealt a very challenging hand.
To understand the difficult position courts have been put in, consider the proposition that a proposed legal rule is unattractive because
its imposition could reduce the frequency or generosity of benefit bargains. Whether that is actually true for a particular legal rule is a complicated matter of policy and empirics. Put another way: if using Less
Protective Legal Rule A will result in more bargains, it will also likely
result in more breaches. Is the marginal increase in bargains, on balance, "worth more" than the marginal increase in breaches? When the
answers to such questions, as here, directly implicate the contour and
equities of the nation's retirement and health policy, such answers
should flow from legislative or agency officials, not Article III judges.1 93
94
They are neither trained for nor enthusiastic about such a role.1

More troublingly, the epistemological near-impossibility of correctly ascertaining Proposed Protective Rule A's marginal value and
cost in the course of a behind-the-bench balancing test obscures a very
important fact. It obscures the fact that the ontological answer to the
question of marginal value and cost will vary with the subject matter of
the benefit bargain to be governed by Proposed Protective Rule A. For
example, there is little independent reason to believe, ex ante, that legal rules governing obligations, judicial review, and remedy for defined
benefit promises and health insurance promises should be "one-sizefits-all."1 95
manifest itself in workplace (including benefit) disputes. Paul M. Secunda, Cognitive Illiberalism and InstitutionalDebiasingStrategies, 49 SAN DIEGo L. REV. (forthcoming 2012), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/paper s.cfm?abstractid=1777104.
193 See Patsy, 457 U.S. at 513.
194 The Court's frequent taking of ERISA cases may be motivated more by a sense of
judicial duty than intellectual interest. Justice David Souter, upon retirement, cited as one
motivation for his departure a lack of interest in "numbingly technical cases involving applications of pension or benefits law." Jess Bravin & Evan Perez, Justice Souter to Retire from
Court, WALL ST. J., May 1, 2009, at Al. There was much to recommend about Justice Souter, but there is no accounting for taste.
195 See Blumstein & Zubkoff, supra note 6, at 401 ("[T]here is a strong argument that
no single standard and style of health care can be appropriate for all Americans, given
their widely varied attitudes, tastes, and religious convictions, their other needs, and the
necessarily limited resources at their disposal . . . .'" (quoting C.C. Havighurst, Controlling
Health Care Costs, I J. HEALTH POL., POL'Y & L., 471, 491 (1977))). Imagine evaluating
whether or not a particular legal rule is an attractive legal rule for a benefit bargain. A
defined benefit pension promise is very different than a health insurance promise. The
substantive ways in which the parties may fail to understand the terms differ; the promise
length differs; the opportunities for incompetent, strategic, or malicious behavior differ;
the interpretive ambiguity of the core bargain term differs, e.g., a precise mathematical
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The Supreme Court, however, has interpreted ERISA this way, and
thus done exactly the wrong thing when it comes to making benefit
rules: it has been largely indifferent to context.196 That is unlikely to
result in ideal legal rules. Instead it virtually guarantees square pegs for
round holes.197
The problem is made more complicated in that the selection of an
optimal legal rule in a benefit setting need not only consider the effect
of alternate rules, but also the possibility of alternate benefit settings
entirely. That last part requires some explanation. Let us assume that, in
fact, a particular legal rule will be so costly or volatile that it will reduce
the frequency or generosity of employment-based benefit bargains of a particular type. So what? Employment-based benefit bargains are not an
end in and of themselves; they are a means to provide for retirement
and health care. The ultimate cost associated with fewer or less generous
employment benefit bargains is measured by looking at the extent to
which workers not receiving employee benefits will not obtain health
insurance or retirement income as cheaply, or at all, some other way.
Health insurance provides a useful practical illustration of this point. It
formula compared to a broad promise to provide "medically necessary care"; the fitness of
a judge to resolve disputes differs; and the nature and magnitude of the consequences to
the beneficiary in the case of breach differ. There is little if any reason to believe the optimal legal rules across those circumstances will or should be the same. See Maher & Stris,
supra note 9, at 467-73. Even within the category of health bargains, rule optimality would
need to consider heterogeneity of substantive preference. Cf Blumstein & Zubkoff, supra*
note 6, at 401.
196 See, e.g., Lockheed, 517 U.S. at 890-91 (applying the settler doctrine in the pension
setting without serious explanation of its reasoning); Curtiss-Wright, 514 U.S. at 81-82
(same, in the welfare setting). The Court has also ignored context in determining the
rules of review and remedy. See, e.g., Glenn, 554 U.S. at 105, 113 (ignoring the rules of review). No statutory provision speaks to the settlor doctrines or the standard of review, so
the Court was and is free to make law as it sees fit. Regarding remedies, the "benefits" remedy refers to "rights," 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B) (2006); the "fiduciary" remedy to "remedial" and "appropriate" relief, id. §§ 1109, 1132 (a) (2); and the "catch-all" remedy refers
to "appropriate equitable relief," id. § 1132(a) (3). An extended textual analysis is not necessary to see that the provisions are nearly as pliable as a context-sensitive Court might
want them to be. In any event, were the Court in fact confined by text, the objection would
still have force against Congress. Ultimately it does not matter. The problem is that the
rules are difficult to pick, and the right rules are too likely to be different for different
players. The answer is not that Congress should have given clearer instruction to the
courts. The answer is that Congress should reduce the importance of both its and the
courts'judgments.
197 The point is that ERISA, reposing as it does so much authority in federal rulemakers, does not provide an opportunity for any natural corrective. Thus, when federal
judges develop square-peg-for-round-hole rules, effectively no force other than Congress
can address that mistake. Opt-in federalism, in contrast, provides competitive pressure, as
well as an exit option if competitive pressure fails to improve a given rule.
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is difficult for many individuals to obtain health insurance outside the
workplace.1 98
In any insurance promise, the expected cost is a function of the
likelihood a given insured will experience a loss event and the size of
the expected loss. 199 The higher this expected cost, the higher the actuarially fair premium an insurer must charge to be profitable. 200 But if
the insurer offers too high a premium, many potential insureds will be
dissuaded from purchasing policies. 20 1 Health insurance is attractive to
insureds to the extent it reflects an actuarially fair premium plus some
cost increment reflecting the insured's level of risk-aversion. 202
One method for an insurer to charge the appropriate premium is
to "rate" insureds correctly. 203 Insureds that are higher rated for risk are
either (1) not offered insurance at all or (2) offered insurance with an
increased premium, relative to the average-rated insured. 204 The effect
is that some people will be not offered insurance at any price in an unregulated market, whereas others will be offered insurance at a price
they cannot afford.205 Precise rating is difficult. 206 Information asymmetries can result in adverse selection, where an insurer knows less about
the true riskiness of the potential insured than does the insured, and a
premium not reflective of the true expected cost of the insured is offered and accepted. 207 The result is that in the next round of premium
calculation, the premiums increase, and for healthier people, the insurance deal becomes financially unattractive. 208 When healthy people
leave the pool, this departure increases the expected payout per person, which results in higher premiums, which exacerbates the problem,
198 See Diamond, supra note 73, at 1236-37 (explaining that in the small group and individual markets, individuals considered high risk may either be rejected for coverage or
may only obtain coverage at premiums they cannot afford).
199 SANTERRE & NEUN, supra note 65, at 148-54 (discussing the insurance calculus).
200 See id. at 149.
201 See id.
202 See Arrow, supra note 66, at 959-61.
203 In the individual insurance market, this is achievable through the underwriting

process, which occurs at the inception and renewal of the insurance contract. See Diamond, supra note 73, at 1237. Underwriting is where the insurer gathers information regarding the risk profile of the potential insured and rates the insured accordingly. See
Hyman & Hall, supra note 49, at 32.
204 See Diamond, supra note 73, at 1237.
205

See id.

206 SeeJONATHAN GRUBER, PUBLIC FINANCE AND PUBLIC POLICY

207

311-13 (2005).

Id. (explaining adverse selection). See generally Michael Rothschild &Joseph Stiglitz,

Equilibrium in Competitive InsuranceMarkets: An Essay on the Economics of Imperfect Information,
90 Q.J. ECONOMIcs 629 (1976) (offering the theory of adverse selection).
208 See Hyman & Hall, supra note 49, at 32.
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and so on. 209 Severe adverse selection problems can destroy or wildly

distort insurance markets, and require government intervention. 210
Adverse selection risks decline to the extent an insurer can insure
a group bound together by some commonality other than an interest in
obtaining health insurance-for example, the same employer, the same
geographical region, or the same church. 211 Thus employment-based
health insurance is useful because, by aggregating people for reasons
unrelated to health status, it ameliorates the problem of adverse selection, which imperils the functioning of the individual health insurance
market. 212
Accordingly, in selecting optimal legal rules in the employment
benefit context, one must consider alternative benefit possibilities. To
the extent the individual market is afflicted by adverse selection distortions, imposing legal rules that discourage employers from offering insurance can potentially have a very steep downside. 213 If an employer
chooses to not offer health insurance because of costly or uncertain
legal rules, the consequence could be that some of the people who
would have been beneficiaries of such unmade promises will not obtain
insurance at all on the individual market. 214
Besides adverse selection, 215 other obstacles to securing benefits
outside of employment bargains exist. There are several reasons-many
identified in behavioral economic literature-why workers who do not
receive retirement or health benefits at work may be unlikely to secure

&

209 See GRUBER, supra note 206, at 312 (noting that less risky individuals are more likely
to seek lower insurance coverage than risky individuals).
210 The degree to which adverse selection manifests itself in practice is contested. See,
e.g., Gruber, supra note 5, at 577 (noting there is "mixed" evidence on the degree to which
those who choose to be insured are "adversely selected"). For a clear treatment of the topic, see generally Peter Siegelman, Adverse Selection in Insurance Markets: An Exaggerated
Threat, 113 YALE L.J. 1223 (2004).
211 See Hyman & Hall, supra note 49, at 32.
212 See Allison Hoffman, Oil and Water: Mixing Individual Mandates, Fragmented Markets,
and Health Reforn, 36 Am. J.L. & MED. 7, 28 (2010) ("Insurers have little concern of adverse
selection with respect to large, employer-sponsored group insurance.").
213 See id. (discussing adverse selection).
214 See Diamond, supra note 73, at 1237. But cf Siegelman supra note 210, at 1231
n.26 (challenging the strength of the argument that adverse selection concerns support
narrowing liability standards).
215 See, e.g., Gruber, supra note 5, at 574, 577 (noting that the nongroup insurance
market "has not provided a very hospitable environment" and that the high cost of health
insurance is a large reason for uninsurance). A milder form of adverse selection is thought
to exist in the pension context. See Feldstein, supra note 36, at 8 (discussing adverse selection in individual annuity markets).
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such benefits through alternate arrangements. 216 These complications
make even more difficult the appropriate weighing of considerations
when selecting benefit rules in different contexts.
Given the complexities of the marginal costs and advantages of
various legal rules, the difference in those valuations across contexts,
and the comparative difficulties associated with securing benefits
through other means, it is likely, if not certain, that federal judges are
not best suited to this task.217
I do not mean to suggest that choosing optimal legal rules is easy.
To the contrary, it is quite difficult for any actor. It involves complicated
judgments regarding what data to collect and rely on, what assumptions
should govern in the absence of data, and which subjects of the rules
are best suited to bear what levels of risk. Optimal benefit rules are not
easily determined. Confidence regarding the rightness of a particular
rule selection is modest at best. 218 In addition, different rules might be
optimal given the preferences of different individuals or groups. Preferences for cost and security vary; preference for legal rules will vary
accordingly.219
Selecting optimal legal rules regarding retirement and health care
bargains necessarily implicates textured, varying, and challenging policy questions. 220 Divergent preferences increase the challenge, diminishing the appeal of a centralized mechanism for answering those ques216 See supra note 41 and accompanying text. See generally EdwardJ. McCaffery, Comments
on Liebman and Zeckhauser, Simple Humans, Complex Insurance, Subtle Subsidies (U.S.C.
Law & Econ. Working Paper No. 81, 2008), availableat http://aw.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1085&context=usclwps (discussing cognitive biases in the health insurance
context).
217 Cf Stein, supra note 93, at 110 (arguing that courts are "poorly suited" to answer
questions ERISA left unanswered).
218 The more uncertain and challenging rule selection is, vesting authority in a single
decision-maker becomes less appealing. Additional trials, e.g., other rule-makers, become
more appealing. Cf Cass R. Sunstein, Due Process Traditionalism, 106 MICH. L. REv. 1543,
1546 (2008) (noting that "the persistence of a practice across many minds ... makes it
more likely to be correct, wise, or good"). More generally, in many settings, aggregative
reasoning can be helpful to an observer attempting to determine the "right" answer, although it has limits. Cf id. at 1550-52 (discussing aggregative approaches in assessing the
wisdom of legal rules).
219 Nor is the claim of varying preference inconsistent with the observation that considerable uncertainty plagues the task of identifying an optimal rule. Uncertainty around
optimality does not mean that for Group A the cloud of uncertainty does not hover in a
different place than it does for Group B. Imagine there are ten possible rules: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5,
6, 7, 8, 9, 10. If the average uncertainty surrounding a preference is one, then if Group A
prefers Rule 2 and Group B prefers Rule 9, even though uncertainty clouds each group's
preferences, it is clear the Groups prefer different rules.
220 See Maher & Stris, supra note 9, at 435.
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tions. Such perfectly describes ERISA. 221 The conclusion, then, is not
simply that the Court has gotten the answers wrong, although it likely
has. The conclusion is that ERISA, a rigidly centralized statute, has
structural infirmities that one would expect to, and in fact do, frustrate
the search for optimal benefit law. This is true not only regarding the
law ERISA affirmatively produced, but also regarding the law it
blocked-state law.222 The following Part considers a more promising

approach.
III. IMPROVING BARGAIN LAW WITH "OPT-IN FEDERALISM"

Law can specify not only substantive rules, but also who chooses

them. The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act ("ACA") offers a
novel and conceptually fascinating approach regarding who makes and
chooses law: "opt-in federalism." Fusing individual autonomy with decentralization, it is truly twenty-first-century federalism, and has far

reaching implications.
Using a federalist lens, the ACA can be thought of as exercising
federal power in two distinct ways. The first way is a classic (if constitu-

tionally challenged) exercise of federal power-direct federal rulemaking: 223 the ACA specifies that all or certain health insurance bargains in

the country satisfy particular federal requirements.

224

The best exam-

ples of this are the ACA's commands that certain policies provide speci-

fied minimum coverage. 225 Minimum coverage requirements may be
complicated or unwise, but theoretically, they are akin to the federal
221 Nor does it bear the usual advantage of centralized action: the guarantee of a minimum to everyone. ERISA does not guarantee any promises get made.
222 See 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (2006).
223 See, e.g., 42 U.S.C.A. § 18022 (West Supp. 2011) (establishing minimum coverage
requirements); 42 U.S.CA § 300gg-11(a) (West 2003 & Supp. 2011) (prohibiting limits on
lifetime or annual coverage). How one categorizes this direct rulemaking--whether as an
instance of "preemptive" or "cooperative" federalism, or something else, see infra note
256-is an interesting question that deserves attention, but that is not my aim here. The
opt-in federalism element of the statute is more novel. I focus on that and the unexplored
potential it poses for resolving difficult and divisive questions of law and policy regarding
health care and retirement. Cf. generally Kenneth Scott, The Dual Banking System: A Model of
Competition in Regulation, 30 STAN. L. REv. 1 (1977) (discussing the choice made by banks
with respect to federal or state charters). But see Daniel Schwarcz, RegulatingInsuranceSales
or Selling InsuranceRegulation?: Against Regulatory Competition in Insurance, 94 MINN. L. REv.
1707, 1721 (2010) (discussing and criticizing reform proposals calling for increased regulatory choice by insurers in life, property, and casualty markets).
224 See, e.g., 42 U.S.C.A. § 18022.
225 Id. (specifying what package of services need be covered by the policy). Another
example of direct rulemaking is the prohibition on lifetime or annual coverage limits for
all policies sold. See id. 42 U.S.C.A. § 300gg-1I(a).
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government stepping into the shoes of every state government and announcing the rules.
The other way in which the ACA exercises federal power is quite
different. It is not direct rulemaking. The ACA uses federal power to
create a legal meta-structure in which individuals can plausibly "opt-in"
to either federal (specifically ERISA) or state law governing their health
bargains. 22 6 In exercising federal power to create this choice-of-law
structure, the federal government is explicitly not making substantive
law.
In theoretical terms, a legal structure of "opt-in federalism" presents considerable appeal. Because of the way in which it melds individual, state, and federal roles, it seems more likely than any other to
optimize benefit law. Put another way, it is most likely to maximize the
chance that the nation collectively, and citizens individually, will have
access to the most desirable body of law regarding the private provision
of health insurance (and perhaps retirement income). The chief irony,
perhaps, is that although the ACA forces people to make bargains, 227 it
bespeaks a legal structure that can accommodate more individual
choice in governing law-as well as more effective say from the statesthan was the case before the ACA.
A. ACA and Opt-in Federalism
One of the ACA's many aims was to make health insurance available to all. 228 It does so in part by using federal power to address prob-

lems in individual health insurance markets. Specifically, the ACA limits
the permissible scope of underwriting, abolishes the preexisting condition exclusion, and imposes an individual mandate requiring all individuals to have health insurance or pay a penalty.229

226 See infra notes 228-252 and accompanying text. It bears emphasizing that this applies to only the parts of bargains that are not governed directly by ACA. See infra notes
228-252 and accompanying text.
227 One can conceive of an opt-in system without a federal mandate that individuals
buy insurance; a mandate is one mechanism that opens up individual markets.
228 See 42 U.S.C.A. § 18091 (West Supp. 2011).
300
229 42 U.S.C.A. §
gg (West 2003 & Supp. 2011) (specifying rating factors); 42 U.S.C.
§ 300gg-1 (2006 & Supp. II 2008) (guaranteed availability); 42 U.S.C.A. § 300gg-2 (West
2003 & Supp. 2011) (effective Jan. 1, 2014) (guaranteed renewability); 42 U.S.C.A.
§ 300gg-3 (West 2003 & Supp. 2011) (effective Jan. 1, 2014, except effective immediately
for enrollees under 19) (prohibition against preexisting condition exclusion); 26 U.S.C.A.
§ 5000A (West 2011) (mandate) (effective Jan. 1, 2014).
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These three reforms are targeted at ameliorating the adverse selection problem that can destroy or severely hamper individual markets.

230

From this perspective, the ACA is a hyper-form of the benefit as bargain
model. 231 It aims to achieve universal coverage by using federal power to
make bargains realistically possible for those outside the group market.
Importantly, however, the ACA does not limit participation in the individual market it functionally creates to only those who do not have or
cannot get health insurance through their employer. 23 2 Individuals who
wish to obtain insurance other than group insurance offered by their
employer may do so.

233

The consequences of this bear examination.

Recall that there are effectively two markets for health insurancethe group market and the individual market. 234 They were (and are)

governed by different legal regimes. As I have emphasized, employment-based insurance dominates the group market. 235 The legal rules

governing employment-based health insurance are in the main federal
rules, with state regulatory discretion limited under ERISA's preemptive scope. 236 Much of the relevant federal rules are judge-made and
have attracted considerable criticism. 237 In contrast, in the individual

230 If every person is required to obtain insurance, the peril of adverse selection is vastly diminished; there is little need for risk underwriting or preexisting condition exclusions.
See supra notes 203-210 and accompanying text. Congress specifically found that the mandate "is essential to creating effective health insurance markets in which improved health
insurance products that are guaranteed issue and do not exclude coverage of preexisting
conditions can be sold." 42 U.S.C.A. § 18091(a)(2)(I) (West Supp. 2011); cf Amitabh
Chandra, Jonathan Gruber & Robin McKnight, The Importance of the Individual MandateEvidence from Massachusetts, 364 NEw ENG. J. MEDICINE 293, 293-95 (2011) (explaining
reduction in premiums in Massachusetts after instantiation of the mandate).
231 See supranotes 47-75 and accompanying text (discussing benefits as bargains).
232 See 42 U.S.C.A. § 18032(a) (1); see also Amy B. Monahan & Daniel Schwarcz, Will
Employers Undermine Health Care by Dumping Sick Employees?, 97 VA. L. REv. 125, 154-55
(2011).
233 See 42 U.S.C.A. § 18032(a) (1).
234 See, e.g., Diamond, supra note 73, at 1237-38 (discussing the large and small group
markets, and noting that the small group market is much like the individual market); see
also Hyman & Hall, supra note 49, at 30-35 (discussing the comparative advantages of employer-based insurance, or group insurance, compared to individual employee insurance).
This is a bit of an oversimplification, given the peculiarities of small-group markets. For my
purposes, it does not matter.
235 See supra notes 91-222 and accompanying text.
236 See supra notes 91-222 and accompanying text. State regulation exists, of course.
See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b) (2) (A) (2006) (allowing states to regulate insurance). But its
application is limited by ERISA and the small nature of the individual market. See Gruber,
supra note 5, at 573 (explaining that employer-based insurance dominates the private insurance market).
237 See supra notes 47-75 and accompanying text.
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market, regulation in the main is state-based. 238 Because of problems of
adverse selection, however, as well as other obstacles, the individual
market is not accessible to many people. 239
Employment-based group insurance is largely governed by the
federal law of ERISA. 240 In contrast, individual ACA policies will be
health insurance policies that are in significant part governed by state
law.241 The effect of the ACA can thus be summarized as follows: it enacts rules that provide a federal core for health insurance policies sold
in the country; 242 it enacts rules that revitalize the moribund individual
insurance market; 243 and in determining the legal rules governing
238 See Amy B. Monahan, Initial Thoughts on Essential Health Benefits, in 1 NEw YORK
UNIVERSITY REVIEW OF EMPLOYEE BENEFITS AND EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION, supra note

57, at lB-i, 1B-2.
239 See Gruber, supra note 5, at 575 (observing that for less healthy people, it is almost
impossible to obtain complete coverage); Hyman & Hall, supra note 49, at 32 (observing
that adverse selection could destroy the insurance market altogether, when unalleviated by
things such as employment-based insurance).
0 See Monahan, supra note 238, at 1B-3; see also supra notes 121-127.

241

See id.
242 The scope of ACA's "federal core" is not straightforward. Different core federal re-

quirements govern individual policies as opposed to those that govern group policies.
Compare 42 U.S.C.A. § 300gg-Il (West 2003 & Supp. 2011) (both group and individual
policies may not impose lifetime or annual caps), with 42 U.S.C.A. § 18021(b)(1)(B) (West
Supp. 2011) (providing that the minimum coverage requirements for "qualified health
plans" do not cover "a group health plan or multiple employer welfare arrangement to the
extent the plan or arrangement is not subject to State insurance regulation under [ERISA]"). An excellent initial analysis of the fluctuating nature of the applicable "core" federal coverage was done by Professors Monahan and Schwarcz. See Monahan & Schwarcz,
supra note 232, at 146-51.
My task is entirely different. Certainly, determining the size of the "direct" rulemaking
aspect of a federal statute-which in ACA I am calling the federal "core," or cores, to the
extent the core varies across contexts-is necessary to assess the degree to which an opt-in
federalist structure exists in a given statute. The idea of this Article is that foundational
analysis needs to be done as to why opt-in federalism might be desirable at all, and to pose
questions regarding what categories of rule or policies opt-in federalism might be appropriate for. The answer to that can be used to evaluate whether ACA has struck the right
balance in its actual division of authority.
243 See supra note 230 and accompanying text. ACA also establishes "exchanges." See 42
U.S.C.A. §§ 18031-18033, 18041-18044 (West Supp. 2011). Exchanges "will provide a
point of access for people to comparison shop among individual and small group health
insurance offerings." Sidney D. Watson, Mending the Fabric of Small Town America: Health
Reforn and Rural Economics, 113 W. VA. L. REV. 1, 24 (2010). Millions of people are expected to use the exchanges. See, e.g., CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 19, at 23
tbl.4 (projecting 24 million people will obtain coverage through exchanges); RICHARD S.
FOSTER, DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., ESTIMATED FINANCIAL EFFECTS OF THE "PA-

TIENT PROTECTION AND AFFORDABLE CARE ACT," AS AMENDED 4

(2010),

available at

https://www.cms.gov/ActuarialStudies/Downloads/PPACA_2010-04-22.pdf
(estimating
that 16 million individuals will be covered through exchanges). Insurance can be purchased outside of the exchanges. 42 U.S.C.A. § 18071 (West Supp. 2011).
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health insurance (other than the federal core regulations), the ACA
uses ERISA for group policies and state law for individual policies. 244
This legal structure creates the possibility for opt-in federalism.24 5
Although all health insurance bargains now have a federal core component, the ACA's creation of an alternative individual health market
reasonably accessible to individuals allows individuals to choose between striking bargains governed by the ACA and ERISA or, alternatively, by the ACA and state law. 246
The most salient example is the law of remedy under the ACA. Individuals, in short, can opt-out of ERISA and its passel of constrictive

2- 42 U.S.C.A. § 300gg-23 (West 2003 & Supp. 2011) (preserving state authority to regulate insurance to the extent such does not "prevent" the application of an ACA requirement); 42 U.S.C.A. § 18041(d) (West Supp. 2011) ("Nothing in this chapter shall be
construed to preempt any State law that does not prevent the application of the provisions
of this chapter."). ACA provides no remedies, and thus the remedies available to a purchaser of individual insurance in the case of wrongfully denied coverage would be those of
state law.
245 There are certainly practical obstacles to choice, in the form of lost employer contributions or different tax treatment, that are not trivial. See, e.g., Monahan & Schwarcz,
supra note 242, at 155, 170-71. That is a fact of practical rather than theoretical importance. If opt-in federalism is conceptually appealing, then that justifies making policy
changes to truly level the options. Additional legislation, for example, could require employers' contributions to be portable and/or level tax treatment regarding individual insurance purchases. Moreover, worker preferences may result in employers, in response to
labor pressures, constructing benefit regimes that enable insurance choice through health
reimbursement arrangements. See, e.g., id. at 160-61 (discussing means by which employers
can enable choice but expressing concern over the consequences).
I note again a more general point: the aim of this Article is to consider whether "optin federalism" is an appealing theoretical mechanism to make and choose benefit law, not
whether ACA does a particularly good job of instantiating an opt-in federalist approach.
ACA admits of opt-in federalism, but may botch the specifics, and I do not pretend otherwise. Of course, specifics matter. What legal rules should come directly from the federal
government in the form of "direct rulemaking" and what legal rules should be in the "optin space" is no small issue; whether ACA struck the right balance there is a matter unto
itself. Ensuring that individuals have true options regarding whatever categories of legal
rules are in the opt-in space is yet another issue that requires separate treatment. Moreover, permitting choice regarding some legal rules may present risk-classification problems
(because of employer gaming or otherwise) or face cognitive hurdles. The answer to such
thorny practical issues will depend on the content of the legal rules being chosen and will
inform the means by which we might address the foregoing concerns.
246 The statute is neither a model of clarity in its particulars or simplicity in the interlocking nature of its scheme. It may be that different interpretations of portions of the
statute, or of collective portions, threaten the reality of opt-in federalism in ACA. That is
not my view, but it is not impossible; no one, for example, would have predicted how the
Supreme Court construed ERISA. See supra notes 130-179 and accompanying text. Such
does little to undermine my point, however: ACA admits the possibility of opt-in federalism, and it is that possibility we should keep in mind both when assessing (or even adjudging) ACA and imagining future reforms moving forward.
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judge-made rules.24 7 A citizen living in State Xwho receives group insurance through his employer will be party to a bargain that is governed by
the ACA in terms of its core requirements and by the federal law of ERISA for remedy.248 If that same citizen chooses to purchase a policy on
the ACA individual market, that person will be subject to the ACA's core
rules but state rules of remedy.249 The ACA permits individuals to opt

for the source of legal rules-federal or state-governing bargains they
strike. If they choose employment insurance, they are choosing federal
rules.250 If they choose individual insurance, they are choosing state
rules251-hence the term "opt-in federalism." 25 2
B. The Appeal of Opt-in Federalism
Some legal rules directly govern everyday conduct, such as rules of
negligence. Other legal rules do not directly regulate conduct, but instead regulate who has the power to make legal rules. A convenient if
imperfect shorthand might be to label the former "rules of law" and the
latter "rules of power." Rules of power specify who can make rules of
law.253
Rules of power can train themselves along different divisions of
authority. Federalism, for example, is rule of power theory that seeks to
desirably allocate power between national and local governments, i.e., a

See 42 U.S.C.A. § 18032(a) (West Supp. 2011).
See id. § 18032(a); 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a) (1) (B), (a)(2), (a) (3)(B) (2006).
249 See 42 U.S.C.A. § 18032(a).
250 See 29 § 1132(a) (1)(B), (a) (2), (a) (3) (B) (2006); supra note 244 and accompanying
text. I have presumed here that in the case where an employer purchases a policy from a
state "exchange" and offers it to employees, the remedies available to an employee are
ERISA remedies, not state law remedies. See 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B), (a)(2), (a)(3)(B).
See generally Monahan, supra note 238, at 1B-2 to -3 (discussing the triggered sources of law
in different employment scenarios). Were that not the case, it would simply lessen the
number of people with an option.
251 See 42 U.S.C.A. § 18032(a); Monahan, supra note 238, at 1B-2.
252 See id. Nor obviously is opt-in federalism, as a theoretical approach, limited to rules
of remedy. It can apply to all types of legal rules-notice, procedure, duty, construction,
presumption, and so on.
253 One immediately thinks of H.L.A. Hart's distinction between "primary" obligationimposing rules and "secondary" rules of power. See H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAw
77-96 (1961); see also NEIL MACCORMICK, H.L.A. HART 35 (1981) (discussing Hart's "rules
of obligation" and "power-conferring" rules). I use my informal "rule of law" and "rule of
power" distinction not as a commentary on what law is, but merely as an argumentative
device to help explain the work the opt-in federalism part of ACA does, namely, increasing
the roles individuals and states play in making and choosing law.
247

248
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power allocation between sovereigns. 2 4 Separation of powers is a rule
of power theory that seeks to allocate power among different departments within a government, i.e., power allocation within a sovereign. 25 5
Rules of power need not be mutually exclusive.256 The functional
sharing of lawmaking or enforcement authority between sovereigns or
within sovereigns is obviously a form of power allocation. 25 7 In modern
arrangements, frequently power is shared, with the background formal
rules of power specifying (with varying degrees of clarity) that one
lawmaker must defer to the other when there is conflict in a specified
area, but with cooperation sought and conflict avoided as much as pos-

254 This is true whether one conceives of the power of the inferior sovereign to be
rooted in de jure or de facto autonomy. Cf Heather K. Gerken, Foreword:FederalismAll the
Way Down, 124 HARV. L. REv. 4, 7 (2010) (discussing the conflict between courts and scholars). There is a nearly endless amount of literature describing, attacking, or defining what
"federalism" does or should mean in modern times. Cf DAvIs, supra note 5, at 216 (noting
that "[i]f there are now ten ways of looking at the subject [of federalism], how many more
will there be by the year 4000 A.D.?"). Of course "federalism" can conceivably cover, and
historically has described, many very different arrangements. See, e.g., id. at 2 ("If we wish
to come to terms with this political concept, we must come to terms with its history . . . .").

See

generally ALISON

L. LACROIX, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF AMERICAN FEDERALISM

(2010) (illustrating a recent and engaging treatment of the life and times of American
federalism). In any event, I use "federalism" here in the broadest, most functional sense of
the term: as a description of a system in which national and subnational governments each
play some material policymaking role in a given field.
255 The famous Erie doctrine operates along both federalist and separation of power
dimensions, attempting to chart out when federal procedural law displaces state law, and
calibrating the answer based on whether the federal rules were instantiated by the federal
legislature or the federal bench. See Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938);
Stephen B. Burbank & Tobias Barrington Wolff, Redeeming the Missed Opportunities of Shady
Grove, 159 U. PA. L. REv. 17, 25-26 (2010) (noting that in the Erie context "the allocation
of lawmaking power between the federal government and the States depends on the
source of federal lawmaking power").
256 A sensible categorization of federalist approaches, in descending order of federal
power, can be thought of as "preemptive federalism," "cooperative federalism," and "dual
federalism." See Philip J. Weiser, Federal Common Law, CooperativeFederalism, and the Enforcement of the Telecom Act, 76 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1692, 1693 (2001) [hereinafter Weiser, Federal
Common Law] (discussing variants of federalism). Preemptive federalism is what it sounds
like. See id. Cooperative federalism envisions federal and state authority working in tandem
to design optimal rules, as opposed to "dual federalism," in which separate spheres of authority exist. See Philip J. Weiser, Towards a ConstitutionalArchitecturefor CooperativeFederalism, 79 N.C. L. REv. 663, 665, 671 (2001) [hereinafter Weiser, Cooperative Federalism] (discussing cooperative federalism); see also Edward S. Corwin, The PassingofDualFederalism, 36
VA. L. REv. 1, 1-2 (1950) (describing dual federalism and its diminished fortunes in the
aftermath of the New Deal and World War 11); Roderick M. Hills, Jr., The PoliticalEconomy of
Cooperative Federalism: Why State Autonomy Makes Sense and "Dual Sovereignty" Doesn't, 96
MICH. L. REv. 813, 815-17 (1998) (discussing cooperative and dual federalism).
2s7 See, e.g., Weiser, FederalCommon Law, supra note 256, at 1693.
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sible. 258 Agency deference is a rule of power theory that seeks to coop-

eratively share power within a sovereign, i.e., between courts and agencies (although it can also happen across sovereigns).259
Opt-in federalism is an innovative and intriguing way to allocate
power. The core intuition is that, with respect to important particulars
of the health insurance bargain, federal and state sovereigns have parallel rulemaking power. Respective sovereigns' bodies of law are triggered
to the extent that an individual opts-in to that body of law; choice and
federalism are fused. The theoretical appeal of such an arrangementas framed but certainly not perfectly embodied by the ACA-is manifold, as the following Sections examine below. 260

1. Preferences
First, opt-in federalism increases the likelihood that individual preferences regarding rules of law will be realized. 26 ' To the extent an individual can freely choose from various policies available on the ACA
individual market, rather than accept the ERISA insurance policy offered by his employer, the chances for preference maximization increase. 262 Unlike traditional federalism, where the individual must
move between states to take advantage of different rules,26 3 opt-in fed258

See, e.g., Weiser, CooperativeFederalism, supra note 256, at 665.

Cf. Weiser, Federal Common Law, supra note 256, at 1768 (describing modern federalism as using "federal courts as advisors to and watchdogs over federal regulatory agencies,
state agencies, and Congress, more than as direct lawmaking authorities").
260 The following caveat bears considerable emphasis. For theoretical and expository
clarity, I use an "idealized" ACA as a frame to present the idea, and potential appeal, of
opt-in federalism. That is, I imagine ACA as setting up a legal structure where individuals
can tax-neutrally, see supra note 78, obtain insurance through their employer or via the
individual market; where certain aspects of the insurance promise are governed by ACA,
whether obtained through the employer or via the individual market; and where other,
significant aspects of the insurance bargain are governed either by ERISA or state law. See
42 U.S.C.A. § 18032(a)(1) (West Supp. 2011); Monahan, supra note 238, at 1B-2 to -3. That
ACA is not a platonic form of opt-in federalism (particularly in terms of tax; it is not taxneutral) is conceded but of minor theoretical concern. See supra note 245 and accompanying text. This Article, in short, is about opt-in federalism, not the extent to which ACA
obstructs the innovative structure it contemplates.
261 It also, obviously, allows insureds to comparison shop along other metrics, although
such is limited by federal requirements. I focus on choice of law.
262 Such is obviously not so to the extent state law exactly mirrors ERISA law. No state's
law does.
263 See Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. POL. ECON. 416,
418-23 (1956) (evaluating the possibility of exiting ajurisdiction which has an undesirable
rule and the consequences on rule evolution); see also PAUL E. PETERSON, THE PRICE OF
FEDERALISM 18 (1995) (noting that local governments must be responsive to the needs of
local businesses and residents, or residents will relocate); Robert P. Inman & Daniel L.
259
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eralism permits a far less costly manner of expressing one's preference. 264 Admittedly, the choice is only between the law of State X and
ERISA,2 65 but the expression of such choice does not require relocation, which no doubt poses a considerable obstacle to choice.2 66
"Traditional" federalism, of course, theoretically gave any potential
insured the horizontal "vote with the feet" choice between the law of
State Xand State Y2 6 7 But the ACA in principle increases the traditional
federalist option because it creates in every state an individual market
that is by law open to any of that state's residents. 268 In the past, individual underwriting and pre-existing exclusions effectively destroyed the
possibility of horizontal choice among certain insureds. 269 Some people,
even if they had moved to a particular state, simply could not bargain
Rubinfeld, The PoliticalEconomy ofFederalism, in PERSPECTIVES ON PUBLIC CHOICE: A HANDBOOK 73, 83-85 (Dennis C. Mueller ed., 1997) (discussing, in economic terms, that overall
market and social efficiency in a federalist model relies on the ability of citizens to relocate
without cost); Wallace E. Oates, On Local Finance and the Tiebout Model, 71 AM. ECON. REV.
93, 95-97 (1981) (discussing the work of Charles Tiebout).
264 Cf Edward L. Rubin & Malcolm Feeley, Federalism:Some Notes on a NationalNeurosis,
41 UCLA L. REV. 903, 919-20 (1994) (favoring options within "a national, decentralized
program"). In that same article, Professors Rubin and Feeley attempted to distinguish the
virtues of "federalism" from mere "decentralization." See generally id. To oversimplify, their
argument was that "federalism" is undesirable to the extent it means anything more than
"decentralization," an organizational concept that they argued was, on balance, attractive.
See id. at 908-09. Their argument has been criticized in various ways. See, e.g., Vicki C. Jackson, Federalismand the Uses and Limits of Law: Printz and Principle?, 111 HARV. L. REV. 2180,
2183 (1998) (offering multiple criticisms). Although this distinction may be quite important elsewhere-particularly regarding the appropriate judicial posture towards "federalism" -I think for my purposes, labels matter less than does a functional assessment of the
legal choice structure ACA arguably creates.
26 Because the individual states regulate insurance, consumers cannot purchase insurance "across state lines" to avail themselves of the rules of another state. See Walter W.
Heiser, Due Process Limitations on Pre-Answer Security Requirements for Nonresident Unlicensed
Issuers, 88 NEB. L. REV. 494, 496 (2010) ("Each state has the power to regulate insurance
companies who conduct business within the state's boundaries.").
266 See, e.g., James M. Buchanan & CharlesJ. Goetz, Efficiency Limits ofFiscalMobility: An
Assessment of the Tiebout Model, 1 J. PUB. ECON. 25, 26-39 (1972) (examining cost and likelihood of movement); Brian Galle & Joseph Leahy, LaboratoriesofDemocracy?Policy Innovation
in Decentralized Governments, 58 EMORY L.J. 1333, 1366 (2009) (questioning whether, in a
federalism analysis, the costs of relocation are worth the purported efficiency gains); Brian
D. Galle, The Role of Charity in a Federal System 49-69 (FSU College of Law, Public Law
Research Paper No. 394, 2011), availableat http://ssrn.com/abstract=1473107(discussing,
in Part IV, how relocation costs are significant and can undermine notions of competitive
federalism).
267 See supra note 264 and accompanying text.
2- See 42 U.S.C.A. § 18032(a) (1) (West Supp. 2011).
269 Cf. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 1201, 124
Stat. 119, 154-61 (2010) (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-I to -7) (promoting nondiscrimination in health care coverage).
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their way into the markets in which that state's law (as opposed to ERISA) governed, and thus did not have true horizontal choice. 270 The
ACA improves horizontal as well as vertical choice, and in both ways in271
creases the likelihood that individual preferences will be satisfied.
Moreover, those who remain subject to ERISA's constrictive rulesto the extent their state offers a different regime-have agreed to be
governed by ERISA rules. 272 There is a marked difference between a
world where there is no realistic choice other than to live under a federal regime where judges assumed policymaking roles outside their institutional competence 273 and a world where one can, if one so chooses, optin to such a regime because the content of those judge-made rules are
274
the ACA makes
nonetheless appealing. ERISA supplies us the former;
275
possible the latter.
In the broadest terms, the refuge of an alternative is deeply satisfywe all accept that we must be governed by law, we are
Although
ing.
continually troubled that the law might be "wrong," in two senses. The
first is that the law does not actually reflect the preference of the majority (or the command of some constitutional document that supersedes
the majority will), but is instead the law of a legislature unduly influenced by special interests or made by rogue judges. 276 The second is
that the law very well might reflect the majority preference or some
constitutional command, but it does not reflect our personal preference. In either case the solace of another sovereign is appealing, and
being able to opt-in at little cost is more appealing still. It is vastly easier
than attempting to change the original sovereign's rule (either by democratic or judicial means, or by insurrection) or to escape the rule by
physically leaving the sovereign's dominion. The last two are quite difficult, and thus in reality people faced with undesirable rules simply accept them; we all intuitively know this, and thus all intuitively appreciate the power of an easily exercisable option.

270 See Gruber, supra note 5, at 574 (noting the difficulty of obtaining coverage in the
nongroup market).
271 See42 U.S.C.A. § 18032(a)(1) (West Supp. 2011).
272 See id.
273 See supra notes 130-179 and accompanying text.
274 See supra notes 130-179 and accompanying text.
275 See 42 U.S.C.A. § 18032(a) (1).
276 See, e.g., supra notes 180-189 and accompanying text (discussing criticisms of the
U.S. Supreme Court's interpretations of ERISA for running counter to Congress's intent).
But see note 245 (discussing hurdles to choice under the ACA).
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2. States
The ACA restores to the states a significant measure of regulatory
power that vanished during ERISA's reign. 277 ERISA's preemptive power, by definition, emanates from the regulation of employee benefit
plans. 278 In practice, ERISA granted an outsized role to federal regula-

tion of health insurance because the majority of private health insurance in the United States was delivered through employee benefit
plans. 279 The ACA sidesteps the issue by in effect setting up a plausible

alternative system of insurance that exists outside of employee benefit
plans. 28 0 To be sure, while ACA insurance is subject to core federal requirements, important law governing the bargain is a matter of state
law. Remedies are the clearest example. 281
Such power is wisely vested in state authorities, on the classic rationale that they are more aware of and responsive to local preferences
of constituents. 282 In other words, they are more likely to discern the
preferences of citizens than a national government that is literally and
proverbially farther away.283 In addition, local rule is more accommodating to regional diversity of preference; some states' citizens may, as a
body, simply prefer one set of legal rules over another. 284 Both Californians and Texans are likely to prefer a regime where their state governments get to craft significant portions of law in a way consistent with
277 See 42 U.S.C.A. § 18032(a) (1); supranotes 130-222 and accompanying text.
278 See 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (2006).
279 See id.; supra notes 96-129 and accompanying text (discussing the predominant role
of the federal government under ERISA).
280 See 42 U.S.C.A. § 18032(a) (1).
281 See supra notes 228-252 and accompanying text.
282 See, e.g., Gerken, supra note 254, at 7 (describing the asserted virtues of federalism
as "choice, competition, experimentation, and the diffusion of power"); Stewart, supra
note 181, at 917-18 (describing various rationales in favor of federalism). In American law
"the basic assumption is that states have authority to regulate their own citizens and territory." Cass R. Sunstein, InterpretingStatutes in the Regulatory State, 103 HARv. L. REv. 405, 469
(1989).
There are constitutional arguments in favor of federalism "even if one could prove
that federalism secured no advantages to anyone." New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144,
157 (1992); see alsoJohn C. Yoo, TheJudicial SafeguardsofFederalism, 70 S. CAL. L. REv. 1311,
1357-91 (1997) (arguing that the Constitution envisions the judiciary policing the power
allocations of federalism). It is not necessary to consider the merit of such constitutional
arguments here.
283 See FELIX FRANKFURTER, MR. JUSTICE HOLMES AND THE SUPREME COURT 67 (1938)
("[Flederalism is a response to size.").
284 See Michael W. McConnell, Federalism: Evaluatingthe Founders'Design,54 U. CHI. L.
REv. 1484, 1493 (1987) (reviewing RAOUL BERGER, FEDERALISM: THE FOUNDERS' DESIGN
(1987)) (noting the argument that local government better reflects local preferences).
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local preferences, rather than being subject to a uniform federal regime that presumably represents a national preference. 285 Moreover,
the susceptibility of state authority to grassroots or local activism may
increase the odds of civic participation and promote active democracy,
which has value independent of whether participation leads to the actual adoption of a particular rule. 286

State preferences are not set in stone. They can change or be uncertain. To the extent a state needs to "discover" its preferences-as
perhaps something different than the traditional remedial and insurance law of the state, or as a confirmation of the wisdom of such tradition-the creation of a parallel health insurance market in which the
states play a more significant role increases the likelihood that legal innovation and evolution will occur at the state level. 287 A state has a
greater incentive to confirm the preferences of its own citizens or serve
as a "laboratory of benefits" if its regulatory decisions will not be reduced into nothingness by ERISA preemption or by the lack of an audience of people to regulate. 288
The iterative appeal of federalism as an organizational system for
producing "better" rules rests on the notion that states will see what has
worked or not worked in other states and make their own adjustments
285 See, e.g., McConnell, supra note 284, at 1493 ("So long as preferences for government policies are unevenly distributed among the various localities, more people can be
satisfied by decentralized decision making than by a single national authority.").

286

See S. Candice Hoke, Preemption Pathologies and Civic Republican Values, 71 B.U. L.

&

REv. 685, 712 (1991) ("[V]igorous republican federalism would repose substantial political
authority in subnational governments because of their greater access to ordinary citizens
and their participatory efforts."); see alsoJackson, supra note 264, at 2220-23 (describing
the appeal of states as "loci" of political participation). Some have suggested this argument
is no longer persuasive given the size of many states, or for other reasons. See, e.g., Rubin
Feeley, supra note 264, at 916 (questioning the assumption that federalism "fosters participation"); Robert A. Schapiro, Justice Stevens's Theory of InteractiveFederalism, 74 FORDHAM L.
REv. 2133, 2140 (2006) (discussing that state size limits participation possibilities). Presumably the answer depends on the size of the state and the size of the issue. One imagines that health care is an issue on which people have a strong impulse to be heardunlike, for example, the undoubtedly important but narrow in application question of
prison reform-and that impulse is more easily satisfied (and considered by decision makers) when the relevant powers are reasonably close. See McConnell, supra note 284, at 1493.
287 See Gerken, supra note 254, at 7 (noting that federalism engenders experimentation). But see generally Galle & Leahy, supra note 266 (examining the difficulties with the
theory that state governments will innovate).
288 State experimentation in health regulation has been proposed as attractive for
some time. See, e.g., Eleanor D. Kinney, Clearingthe Way for an Effective Federal-StatePartnership in Health Reform, 32 U. MICH. J. L. REFORM 899, 935-36 (1999) (suggesting the benefits
of providing a federal ERISA waiver to states, and noting the desirable effect of granting
Hawaii a waiver).
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accordingly.289 In many cases there is a credible counter-argument that
states pay little attention to what other states do on various local matters. That is unlikely to be the case in connection with rules governing
health bargains. Such law affects everyone, and successful innovation
could greatly advance the careers of responsible policymakers. 290
In addition, restoration of the states' roles in selecting legal rules
for health insurance promises reduces the impact of the policymaking
role forced onto the federal judiciary by ERISA's failure to provide useful guidance on the appropriate tradeoff between security and cost. 291

Almost certainly, an allocation of rulemaking authority that relies less
on judicial prerogative will be more likely to reach optimal legal rules
for a given state. The larger the non-ERISA market for health insurance, the less the aggregate effect federal judge-made rules will have.
States can, according to their views on how power within the state
should be allocated, assign different levels of authority to a variety of
decision makers, along multiple dimensions.

3. Clarity
Finally, opt-in federalism is an appealingly bright-line version of
federalism. In many contexts, the line between federal and state au-

thority is difficult to draw, and thus it is difficult for private actors to
appropriately plan for where that line will be drawn. 292 Pure opt-in federalism is predictable. An individual decides at the bargain's inception
289 Justice Louis Brandeis offered the most famous formulation of this principle: "It is
one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous State may, if its
citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments
without risk to the rest of the country." New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311
(1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). As with all elements of federalism, the innovation rationale has been challenged. See Larry Kramer, UnderstandingFederalism,47 VAND. L. REv. 1485,
1494-95 (1994) (explaining that there is literature on every side of every federalism issue).
See generally Galle & Leahy, supra note 266 (examining difficulties with the theory that state
governments will innovate); Susan Rose-Ackerman, Risk Taking and Reelection: Does Federalism Promote Innovation?, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 593 (1980) (critiquing the idea that the state
governments are innovative lawmakers).
"9 Mitt Romney might be the exception that proves the rule. SeeJames Hohmann, Voters: 'Romneycare' Not Fatal, POLrrICO (Mar. 6, 2011, 3:23 PM), http://www.politico.com/
news/stories/0311/50741.html (discussing the effect of Massachusetts health reform on
Mitt Romney's presidential aspirations).
291 See 42 U.S.C.A. § 18032(a)(1) (West Supp. 2011). Recall that ERISA's failure to provide useful guidance on the appropriate tradeoff between security and cost created this
judicial policymaking role. See supra notes 117-119 and accompanying text.
292 Cf Robert A. Schapiro, Toward a Theory ofInteractiveFederalism, 91 IowA L. REv. 243,
278-317 (2005) (describing the difficulties of drawing lines between state and federal authority).
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whether the bargain (or specific parts thereof) will be governed by federal or state law and expresses that choice in a way readily discernable
to outsiders. Judges need not wade into the murky waters of line drawing; the governing law is the chosen law.293 The parties on the other
side of the bargain know in advance what law governs and can agree to
strike the bargain under such terms or not.
C. Objections to Opt-in Federalism
One can imagine a series of objections to opt-in federalism. A useful way to group them is as concerns about (1) the content of the law
created by opt-in federalism, (2) the undesirable systemic effects opt-in
federalism could lead to, and (3) the utility of choice. 294
1. Content of Law
A central objection to classic federalism is that if power is reposed
in the states to make law, they might use that power poorly-for example, to create bad law. One variant of this argument is that the collective
law of the states will overall be worse than federal law. The classic formulation of this argument is the "race to the bottom" argument. 29
States, when "competing" to make law, may favor rules that are competitively advantageous but socially undesirable. 296 Race to the bottom
arguments assume both that the law will develop in a certain direction

293

Id.

I group them in this way for ease of consideration, not because alternative organizational schemes are necessarily flawed.
29 See, e.g., Richard B. Stewart, Pyramids of Sacrifice? Problems of Federalism in Mandating
State Implementation of NationalEnvironmentalPolicy, 86 YALE L.J. 1196, 1212 (1977) (describing the race to the bottom argument in context of environmental standards).
296 Environmental standards are a classic example. See, e.g., id.
294

Given the mobility of industry and commerce, any individual state or community may rationally decline unilaterally to adopt high environmental standards that entail substantial costs for industry and obstacles to economic development for fear that the resulting environmental gains will be more than
offset by movement of capital to other areas with lower standards.

Id. Businesses will use the threat of exit to deter a state's instantiation of burdensome environmental regulation. See id. The race to the bottom argument can in theory be reason to
justify federal over state regulation in any case where the regulation "imposes costs on

mobile capital." Richard L. Revesz, RehabilitatingInterstate Competition: Rethinking the "Raceto-the-Bottom" Rationalefor Federal Environmental Regulation, 67 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1210, 1211
(1992). Dean Revesz has argued, however, that in the environmental context competition
among states does not lead to an undesirable race to the bottom. Id. at 1211-12.
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and that that direction will be unappealing. 297 It is unlikely both will
occur in an opt-in federalism system.
It is fairly clear that states (and presumably their populations) have
different preferences for law.298 Those preferences reflect some value
judgment about competing costs and benefits. 299 An easy example is tort
law. Expanded liability rules may have heightened the cost of doing
business in a state, but by how much, and whether such is worth it to
secure additional protection for those protected by the rule, is a matter
on which individual states differ.300 One can construct theoretical arguments as to why states may uniformly prefer protective rules that favor
citizens or lenient rules that favor business. 301 But the proof is in the
pudding. Tort law varies considerably-many states have enacted tort
reform, others have not-and so the argument that federalization is
needed to prevent a race to the bottom is unpersuasive.30 2 As for the law
governing insurance bargains: it is unlikely that every state will adopt
weakly protective rules to attract business or strongly protective rules to
assure citizens. That is not how it works currently; insurance law varies

297 If the former is not true, than we are dealing with simple legal diversity; if the latter
is not true, we have either a race to the middle or a race to the top. Consider corporate
law. Professor Cary famously claimed forty years ago that state competition led to a race to
the bottom so undesirable that it should "arrest the conscience of the American bar." William L. Cary, Federalismand Corporate Law: Reflections upon Delaware, 83 YALE L.J. 663, 705
(1974). Other scholars have contended that competition has led to efficient law. See Bruce
H. Kobayashi & Larry E. Ribstein, Delawarefor Small Fry:JurisdictionalCompetition for Limited
Liability Companies, 2011 U. ILL. L. REv. 91, 95 n.14 (identifying prominent works advancing a race to the top view of corporate law).
298 Cf. Thomas A. Eaton & Susette M. Talarico, Symposium, Testing Two Assumptions
About Federalism and Tort Reform, 14 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 371, 372-73 (1996) (noting that
local governments are more in tune to local needs, which differ).
299 See Maher & Stris, supra note 9, at 435 (noting competing values in determinations
of legal rules).
300 See, e.g., Eaton & Talarico, supra note 298, at 373 (arguing that local government is
more in tune to local needs).
301 See, e.g., id. (describing but empirically rejecting the argument that tort law results
in a race to the bottom that favors resident plaintiffs).
302 There are other arguments in favor of federalizing tort law, but they arise from different concerns, namely externality concerns, see, for example, Abigail R. Moncrieff, FederalizationSnowballs: The Need for NationalAction in MedicalMalpracticeReform, 109 COLUM. L.
REv. 844, 861-88 (2009) (considering malpractice federalization as a solution to "snowball" externalities); uniformity concerns, i.e., whatever the standards are, they should be
the same everywhere; or, lastly, a simple desire to substitute the judgment of plaintifffriendly states with a national judgment that would make the country friendlier to industry, see, for example, Michael A. Coccia, Uniform Product Liability Legislation: A Proposed
FederalSolution, 51 INS. COUNS. J. 104, 104 (1984).
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from state to state. 303 That the potential market for state law is bigger
post-ACA does not appreciably adjust our expectations for diversity.304
Another concern over quality of the law generated by federalism
mechanisms is slightly different. The worry is not that states overall will
be poor lawmakers, but that particularstates could select unjust or otherwise objectionable rules.

305

That is, even if no race to the bottom oc-

curs, one may worry that a handful of states will maliciously or irresponsibly pick rules that, for example, inappropriately protect the
disadvantaged (or, conversely, unduly harm businesses). Jim Crow laws
are the most potent historical example. 306
The response is contextual. Certainly, worries that a particular
state might poorly discharge its lawmaking responsibilities can be a very
acute concern when dealing with rules that largely govern the fortunes
of a marginalized group that lacks democratic voice within the state.
Health insurance rules, on the other hand, are of direct interest to essentially everybody. And even if one concedes that some states may get
it wrong, the downside of error is smaller than in a national system. For
example, ERISA is widely criticized not only because many disagree
with the implicit judgments made by the Court, but because there is
little opportunity to escape the Court's rules. 307 Opt-in federalism sup308
plies most individuals with an out in either direction: federal or state.

303 See, e.g., Donald T. Bogan, ERISA: State Regulation of Insured Plans After Davila, 38 J.
L. REV. 693, 719-21 (2005) (describing differing state rules regarding bad faith).
Obviously state insurance law differs in many ways. Insurance companies presumably price
their premiums accordingly. An insurance company can make money in a high- liability state
or a low-liability state. It depends on the premium. ACA permits pricing based on "rating
area," which should include a state's legal rules. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 300gg (West 2003 & Supp.
2011).
304 See 42 U.S.C.A. § 18032(a) (1) (West Supp. 2011).
305 See, e.g., Lynn A. Baker, Should Liberals FearFederalism?, 70 U. CIN. L. Rov. 433, 445
(2002) (explaining that federalism has been attacked for historically permitting states to
pursue racist policies).
306 Gerken, supra note 254, at 44 ("Pointing to federalism's ugly role in preserving slavery and Jim Crow, . . . critics insist that states should not be allowed to depart from strongly held national norms.").
307 See 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (2006).
305 See, e.g., 42 U.S.C.A. § 18032(a) (1). What if there is no daylight between federal and
state law, i.e., if State Xsimply adopts wholesale as its rules federal rules? That is unlikely to
happen, given the robust presence of insurance rulemaking apparatus in the states. But
assume it does. That is no worse than having an exclusively federal system that gets it
wrong. More likely there will be daylight between federal and state rules (and between
states) and thus individuals will have more choice than they do today, whether through an
opt-in mechanism or traditional means of exit.
MARSHALL
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2. Systemic Concerns
Systemic concerns emanate less from the fear that states will pick
undesirable rules in and of themselves than that they will chose rules
which threaten the efficient discharge of national policy or the proper
functioning of a federal system.
Often these arguments are phrased in externality terms. 309 An externality exists when a player does not fully internalize the cost (or
benefit) of his conduct. The concern here would be that a state might
externalize the cost of legal rules if the federal government is subsidizing the purchase of insurance. In other words, states might choose
more costly rules because they know the rest of the country is going to
help finance them. 310 The strength of this argument obviously depends

upon the rule in question and its incremental cost. More importantly, it
is difficult to see how the federal subsidy in the ACA's case (with respect
to bargains, as opposed to entitlements) will result in a material adverse
change in an individual state's lawmaking calculus.3 11 Only a minority
of individuals will receive a subsidy.312 Most individuals in a state will not
receive a federal subsidy and thus will not be indifferent to more costly
rules. They will have no worse incentive than before to ensure elected
officials make appropriate judgments regarding the best mix of legal
rules.313
Another systemic concern might be related to adverse selection. 314
Individuals will be able to opt-in to different legal rules, depending on
3M See, e.g., Moncrieff, supra note 302, at 861-88 (proposing malpractice federalization
as a solution to "snowball" externalities).
310 Cf id. at 879-90 (noting that federal financing of entitlement programs whose cost
is largely shaped by state action poses a theoretical case for federalization of medical malpractice reform).
311 See 26 U.S.C.A. § 36B (West 2010 & Supp. 2011) (effective Jan. 1, 2014), amended by
Comprehensive 1099 Taxpayer Protection and Repayment of Exchange Subsidy Overpayments Act of 2011, Pub. L. No. 112-9, 125 Stat. 36; Department of Defense and Full-Year
Continuing Appropriations Act, 2011, Pub. L. No. 112-10, 125 Stat. 38.
312 See id. (specifying coverage subsidies).
313 42 U.S.C.A. § 18031(B)(i) (West Supp. 2011) provides that states may require "a
qualified health plan offered in such State offer benefits in addition to the essential health
benefits specified under section 18022(b) of this title" but that States must assume the cost
of doing so. See id. § 18031 (B) (ii) ("(ii)... A State shall make payments-(I) to an individual enrolled in a qualified health plan offered in such State; or (II) on behalf of an individual described in subclause (I) directly to the qualified health plan in which such individual is enrolled; to defray the cost of any additional benefits described in clause (i).")
The degree to which a state's legal rules are held to be "additional benefits" -and thus
need to be paid for directly by the state-will, of course, affect the state's rulemaking calculus.
314 See supra note 207 and accompanying text (explaining adverse selection).
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their preferences. Because such choices will be made in connection
with insurance promises, one might fear that insurance companies
cannot accurately ascertain and price risk. This is possible but less likely
than feared. While the analysis ultimately depends on the exact legal
rules chosen, in general, adverse selection regarding insurance rules
should be much less acute than adverse selection regarding health
conditions.
With health conditions, the biggest fear is that individuals will not
purchase insurance until they are actually sick (and the actually sick are
the set of people who pose the largest payout risk to the insurance
company). If that were the case-if insurance were only or mostly purchased by sick people-premiums would be astronomical, to protect
against the expected payout of the self-selecting pool. Legal rules are
different. Imagine a state insurance regime with more protective remedial rules than ERISA. 315 The highest risk players to insurers in that regime are those who have suffered an event which has or will immediately lead to litigation. Yet the litigation-causing event has already occurred and is thus governed by the (less protective) legal rule of the
regime under which it occurred. 316 Certainly some degree of adverse
selection is still possible, but the most worrisome instance will rarely
happen. Residual concerns, to the extent they exist, can be addressed
with measures such as enrollment periods.
I do not mean to dismiss adverse selection concerns; the aim is
merely to point out that badgers can grow into bears in the telling.
That is, while adverse selection is possible regarding any risk-sorting
that insurance companies cannot appropriately price, assuming that
permitting choice with regard to most legal rules (which, obviously, is a
much larger set than rules of remedy) will have an adverse selection
effect that requires as a solution that individual choice be eliminated
seems a speculative overbid. Legal rules are a different matter than
health conditions. Adverse selection concerns seem more potent regarding the latter than the former, and vary considerably depending on
the specific legal rules at issue. And states, of course, can change the
opt-in legal rules they conclude are leading to intolerable adverse selection.
315 A more protective legal regime should, in theory, mean higher premiums. How
much higher is a matter of considerable dispute, as is whether such incremental higher
cost is worth it. Such a dispute should be left up to the states.
316 I am assuming legal rules do not apply retroactively, and that the governing legal
rule corresponds to when the claim arose, rather than when the claim was filed. There are
nontrivial administrative difficulties in such a case, of course, that need be considered.
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A final commonly made systemic argument against federalist approaches is one of administrative inefficiency.317 A single regime is less
costly for private players to comply with (and for taxpayers to fund).318
The Supreme Court has frequently stressed this point when interpreting ERISA, by identifying the perils of disuniformity. 319 The argument
was that a lack of uniformity regarding health insurance rules increases
the likelihood that the nation's primary suppliers of health insuranceemployers-will offer less generous (or no) health benefits to deal with
the cost of complying with different state regulations. 320 The objection
carries comparatively little weight in an opt-in system. People choose
between employer-provided insurance governed by federal standards
and individual insurance sold by state insurers governed by state standards. 321 There is no multi-compliance burden for either the employer
or the insurer to bear; they live in different regulatory worlds and need
not worry about traveling in-between. 322
3. Choice Difficulties
Much scholarship and literature over the past two decades has challenged long-held notions that choice is an unalloyed good.323 Choice
might worsen outcomes if individuals are not particularly good at mak-

317 See, e.g., Abigail R. Moncrieff, The Supreme Court's Assault on Litigation: Why (and
How) It Might Be Good for Health Law, 90 B.U. L. REv. 2323, 2374 (2010) (discussing high
compliance costs in federalist arrangements).
318 See id.
319 See, e.g., Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 105 (1983) (explaining that obligating employers to differing state laws would increase administrative costs and effect a
reduction of offered benefits); see also Monahan, supra note 127, at 1375-76 (describing
primary burden of state regulation as forcing employers to comply with two regimes);
Moncrieff, supra note 317, at 2374 (discussing high compliance costs in federalist arrangements). Opt-in federalism is, of course, more administratively expensive than the
alternative of having a single national policy regarding every aspect of health insurance,
but such savings are only appealing to the extent one is utterly unmoved by the merits of
federalism.
320 See Shaw, 463 U.S. at 105; Monahan, supra note 127, at 1375-76.
321 See, e.g., 42 U.S.C.A. § 18032(a) (1) (West Supp. 2011).
322 Nor is there a reason to believe states will be administratively worse at promulgating
and enforcing rules regarding health insurance bargains struck by in-state insurers than
the federal government would be in regulating such insurers; states traditionally exercise
authority in this area. This point should not be misconstrued. It is not that the state lawmaking and administration regarding insurance is a picture of efficiency. It is that there is
no particular reason to think that as a result of ACA permitting people to opt into state
law, that state lawmaking will be comparatively inefficient.
323 Cf Ricciardi, supra note 40, at 85-111 (discussing cognitive biases that affect decision making).
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ing choices. 324 Information costs and a host of cognitive biases can diminish the appeal of relying on choice-driven mechanisms to order our
individual and collective affairs. 325 If in fact someone other than an individual "is likely to be the best decision-maker, or, better put, decisionframer,"326 there may be a significant loss of utility when individuals opt
out of the employment benefit bargain world into state insurance regimes.
There are several responses. First, some individuals will make the
right (or mostly right) choices. Opt-in regimes benefit them, and that
positive should not be disregarded. Second, much choice criticism can
be addressed through use of defaults, rather than abolition of choice. 327
Nonetheless, I think the choice criticism has particular merit in the
health insurance context because the most sensible default is probably
a set of legal rules that are more, rather than less, protective. That is, as
a policy matter, I would prefer if an opt-in system was set up in a way
such that the default option is more protective of insureds, given their
cognitive and bargaining limitations. ERISA, which is the default option under the ACA's version of opt-in federalism, is on balance less
protective of individuals than most state regulation. Nonetheless, indictments of default settings, in my view, should not obscure the appeal
of opt-in federalism in general. They simply mean the defaults should
be adjusted. 328
Most importantly, we must consider the appeal of realistic alternatives. That choices are imperfect does not mean no-choice centralized
rulemaking is better. ERISA is the perfect illustration. Virtually no credible observer applauds its health content, yet no politically viable discussion of comprehensive reform of the statute has ever taken place.
Choice infirmities, on the other hand, can be addressed, either at the
federal level or at the state level through educational or informational
mechanisms designed with cognitive limitations in mind. 329 Indeed,

324
325
326
327

See id.
See id.

McCaffery, supra note 216, at 7; see also supra note 40.
See Cass R. Sunstein & Richard H. Thaler, LibertarianPaternalismIs Not an Oxymoron,

70 U. CHI. L. REv. 1159, 1201 (2003) (suggesting the use of default rules that acknowledge
information and cognitive limitations and encourage socially desirable choices). See generally THALER & SUNSTEIN, supranote 39 (same).
325 Cf. Monahan & Schwarcz, supra note 232, at 170-71 (considering the theoretical
possibility that strategic behavior by employers could negatively affect choices). The solution to infirmities in the choice mechanism is to fix them, not abolish choice.
329

See Sunstein & Thaler, supra note 327, at 1201.
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such is a ripe area for innovation, given the relative newness, but increasing awareness, of such concerns.
CONCLUSION

Age and sickness humble us all; such is the iron bargain of mortality. Whatever our philosophical comfort with life's inevitabilities, pragmatic questions remain: How should society allocate resources to address age and illness? And what law should govern those arrangements?
A society can rely on individual resources, private bargains, or the
government to address citizens' retirement and health needs. The ACA
is a landmark piece of health legislation that mandates people make
insurance bargains. Both the wisdom of the bargain model and the
constitutionality of the mandate have prompted intense discussion. In
the heated debates over the ACA, however, little attention has been
paid to the statute's crucial innovation of law: opt-in federalism. This
Article has theorized that, as a means of choosing and making law, optin federalism promotes individual autonomy, encourages favorable evolution of rules, accommodates legal uncertainty, recognizes varying
preferences, empowers states, and can quietly undo previous legislative
mistakes.
Time will tell whether the charm of theory earns the approval of
practice. Yet the charm of theory is broad, because opt-in federalism is
not limited to the ACA, or even the health context. It offers promise as
a means to address the nation's other enormous benefit challenge: retirement security. I close by introducing that intriguing possibility.
Retirement is complex, and entitled to a full treatment, but the
essentials are this. The United States relies enormously on private arrangements to satisfy retirement needs. 330 In the past, the dominant.
retirement vehicle was the "defined benefit" pension.3 31 Today, the dominant vehicle is the "defined contribution" savings account. 332 The
implications of the move away from defined benefit to defined contribution arrangements have been increasingly studied by scholars in law,
economics, and psychology.3 33
330 Current estimates of assets held in ERISA retirement plans exceed six trillion dollars.

COLLEEN E. MEDILL, INTRODUCTION To EMPLOYEE BENEFITs LAw: POLICY AND PRAC-

TICE 87 (3d ed. 2010).

331 See Zelinsky, supra note 36, at 453.
32 See, e.g., id. at 469-71.
333 See supra note 33 and accompanying text; see also FRANK J. LANDY & JEFFREY M.
CONTE, WORK IN THE 21ST CENTURY 504 (3d ed. 2010) (industrial psychologists describing
"psychological" effects of defined contribution arrangements on workers). See generally
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Because the vast majority of private retirement arrangements implicate some level of fiduciary obligation, no one disputes the enormous importance of optimizing fiduciary law. Currently, the development of fiduciary law in the retirement context is almost entirely
federal. This has been much criticized, mostly by scholars or stakeholders who believe federal rulemakers have simply gotten the contours of the law "wrong." 334 The correct substantive alternative is not
clearOpt-in federalism represents a potential way to harness the power
of aggregative and diversified policymaking while offering a check
against races to the bottom and excessive compliance costs. For example, one can imagine a defined contribution system where employers
have a single duty: to have as the default choice an investment option
that meets fairly conservative federal guidelines and is governed by a
congressionally defined set of fiduciary duties. Other (or supplemental,
if the federal investment is mandatory) choices for employees could be
offered by non-employer investment firms and structured in such a way
as to permit embrace of some combination of federal and state rules
for fiduciary obligations. The rules for employers would be clear and
uniform, but diversity in both investment options and law would be
preserved. Obviously the specifics matter, and are complicated, but the
notion of a protective federal core with state law options seems a more
promising approach than either the status quo or traditional decentralized options.
The ACA may be unwise in its substantive particulars; it may even
be unconstitutional. The battles on those fronts are furious. But the
legislation suggests an exciting new species of federalism that combines
the virtues of choice and decentralization. It would be a shame if that
were lost in the crossfire.

ALICIA H. MUNNELL & ANNIKA SUNDEN, COMING UP SHORT: THE CHALLENGE OF 401(K)

PLANS (2004) (pension economists identifying policy challenges of 401(k) arrangements).
ss4 See generally, e.g., Fischel & Langbein, supra note 52 (criticizing ERISA fiduciary law).
Recently, the Department of Labor released proposed regulations regarding fiduciary status
in connection with providing investment advice. Definition of the Term "Fiduciary," 75 Fed.
Reg. 65,263-78 (proposed Oct. 22, 2010) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R pt. 2510). Various stakeholders have expressed concern regarding the regulations. See, e.g., Letter from ERISA Indus.
Comm. to Dep't of Labor, Feb. 2, 2011, available at http://www.eric.org/forms/upload
Files/26E6B0000001D.filename.ERICCommentsonProposedDefinition-ofFiduciary_02
021l.pdf (criticizing and commenting on proposed regulations).

